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This paper reviews current issues in youth labour markets in developed countries. It
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1. Introduction
Youth unemployment is one of the most pressing economic and social problems
confronting those countries whose labor markets have weakened substantially since 2008,
following the near-collapse of worldwide financial markets. There is an element of déjà
vu around this development: youth unemployment first became a serious problem for
industrialized countries during the 1980s. While labour markets were booming in the
early part of this century, youth unemployment was still a concern. But the particularly
rapid increase in youth unemployment during the current recession has once again
sharpened the policy focus on this issue.
The overall increase in unemployment has been dramatic: the October 2009 IMF in its
World Economic Outlook, 2009, suggests that the unemployment rate in advanced
economies will rise from 5.4 per cent in 2007 to 9.3 per cent in 2010. The IMF expects
this number to peak at over ten per cent.1 The OECD in its Economic Outlook, 86,
November 2009, forecasts that the OECD unemployment rate will be 9.8% in 2010.2 The
OECD generally is less optimistic about how high unemployment rates will increase than
the IMF.
This paper focuses particularly on youth unemployment, why we should be concerned
about it, why it is increasing again, how the present difficulties of young people entering
the labour market differ from those of the past and what useful lessons have been learned
that may guide future policy on youth unemployment. We focus mainly on the UK and
USA, but introduce evidence from other countries where appropriate. The youth
joblessness crisis of the early 1980s appears to be repeating itself. It feels like déjà vu.
2. Youth labour markets
Table 1 reports how OECD countries have been impacted by the recession. We report
the turning point of the recession, measured by the low point of the unemployment rate
and the extent to which the unemployment rate has increased since then. Spain, Ireland
and the United States have had the largest increases in unemployment. Germany and the
Netherlands have had the smallest increases.
1 The IMF forecasts unemployment in 2010 will be as follows: advanced economies 9.3%; United States
10.1%; Euro area1 11.7%; Germany 10.7%; France 10.3%; Italy 10.5%; Spain 20.2%; Netherlands 6.6%;
Belgium 9.9%; Greece 10.5%; Austria 6.4%; Portugal 11.0%; Finland 9.8%; Ireland 15.5%; Slovak
Republic 10.3%; Slovenia 6.1%; Luxembourg 6.0%; Cyprus 5.9%; Malta 7.6%; Japan 6.1%; United
Kingdom1 9.3%; Canada 8.6%; Korea 3.6%; Australia 7.0%; Taiwan 5.9%; Sweden 8.2%; Switzerland
4.5%; Hong Kong 6.5%; Czech Republic 9.8%; Norway 3.8%; Singapore 3.7%; Denmark 4.2%; Israel
8.6%; New Zealand 7.9%; Iceland 10.5%; major advanced economies 9.4% and newly industrialized Asian
economies 4.4%;
2 The OECD forecast for unemployment rates in 2010 by country is as follows: Australia 7.7%; Austria
7.9%; Belgium 10.6%; Canada 9.8%; Czech Republic 9.2%; Denmark 7.9%; Finland 10.8%; France
11.2%; Germany 11.6%; Greece 10.3%; Hungary 11.7%; Iceland 9.9%; Ireland 14.8%; Italy 10.2%; Japan
5.7%; Korea 3.9%; Luxembourg 7.2%; Mexico1 6.9%; Netherlands 7.0%; New Zealand 7.9%; Norway
4.3%; Poland 11.6%; Portugal 11.2%; Slovak Republic 13.6%; Spain 19.6%; Sweden 11.4%; Switzerland
5.1%; Turkey 16.4%; United Kingdom 9.7%; United States 10.1%; Euro area 12.0% and Total OECD
9.8%.
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The young, have been particularly affected, by the rising levels of unemployment
associated with this recession, in Europe and North America. Table 2 shows the rise in
youth unemployment rates from July 2008 to July 2009. Currently youth unemployment
rates for the under 25s in the EU27 are 19.7% and 17.8% in the United States
respectively. They are especially high in Spain (38.4%). They are everywhere higher
than adult rates. The final column gives the ratio of youth to overall unemployment rates.
Youth rates are more than two and a half times overall rates in Belgium, Finland, France,
Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK.
In 2008, the ILO3 noted that recently there had been a declining trend in youth
unemployment around the world. The world unemployment rate of youth aged 15-24
rose from 10.9% in 1999 to a peak in 2004 of 12.6% and declined to 11.9 per cent by
2007 (Table 3). The ILO noted that the world youth unemployment rate was nearly three
times the adult rate but 2.4 times in the developed world. It is apparent that, in contrast to
the rest of the world, the trend in youth unemployment has been rising in the UK, as has
the ratio of youth-to-adult rates.
The United Nations (2007) confirmed the finding of high youth unemployment rates and
high youth-to-adult rates in the UK.4 They estimated this ratio in the UK at 3.6 in 2005,
which, in Europe was only exceeded by Malta (3.7), Italy (3.9), Sweden (3.8) and Iceland
(4.5) and joint sixteenth with Costa Rica and Haiti out of 117 countries. Outside Europe,
New Zealand was the only OECD country with a higher ratio (3.8).
The proportion of the young in the UK who are in full-time education, increased from
26% in 1993 to 38% in 2007. This proportion is still well below that of many other
countries. Data from the OECD suggests that the proportion of the young who are in
school is considerably higher in, for example, Belgium (60%); Finland (56%); France
(61%), Italy (57%); Luxembourg (69%) and Sweden (57%). One response to rising
unemployment on the part of youth has been to return to full-time education
(Blanchflower and Freeman, 2000, Rice, 1999).5
One effect of the increased participation in further education is that the 16-24 cohort, are
now better qualified than they were during the last recession. Thus, for example, in 1993,
5.8 per cent of 16-24 year olds were graduates, while in 2008 that share had risen to 13.2
per cent. The improvement in qualifications is more concentrated among females than
males. By 2008, the proportion of females aged 18-24 with no qualifications had fallen to
4.6 per cent, but for males was still over 7 per cent. Reflecting the generally higher skills
profile among females, it is also worth noting that mean hourly wages for females are
3 ILO (2008), 'Global employment trends for youth', October, ILO Geneva.
4 United Nations (2007), 'The world youth report 2007—young people’s transition to adulthood: progress
and challenges', United Nations (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/wyr07_complete.pdf).
5 P. Rice (1999), 'The impact of local labour markets on investment in higher education: evidence from the
England and Wales Youth Cohort Studies', Journal of Population Economics, 12, pp. 287-312.
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higher than those for males among this age group, though not significantly so (Source:
Labour Force Survey).
The OECD (2008b) recently also noted that, even before the slowing of the UK labour
market in the spring of 2008, a variety of indicators of youth performance between 2005
and 2007 do paint a more mixed picture.6 On the one hand, they noted that the youth
employment rate is 12 percentage points higher than the OECD average and long-term
unemployment has decreased by over 7 percentage points over the past decade. The
young in the UK are less likely to be in temporary work but more likely to be part-time
than in the OECD as a whole. Dropout rates continue to be below the OECD average.
Low-paid employment is still common among youth but its persistence has halved since
the early 1990s..
There is also some evidence from around the world, that the least educated, as well as
those with the lowest skill levels, plus minorities and immigrants, are especially impacted
by the drop in demand. In the US for example, in August 2009, black unemployment
rates stood at 15.1% and Hispanics at 13.0% compared with 8.9% for whites.7
Unemployment rates for high school dropouts were 15.6% compared with 9.7% for high
school graduates, 8.2% for those with some college and 4.7% for those with a college
degree and higher.
In the UK, unemployment rates are much higher for the least skilled occupations.
According to weighted data from the recently available UK 2009 Q2 Labour Force
Survey (LFS), unemployment rates by highest qualification were as follows.
Degree or equivalent 3.7%
Higher degree 2.7%
First degree 3.8%
Other degree 3.3%
Higher education 4.2%
GCE A level or equivalent 7.3%
GCSE grades A-C or equivalent 9.6%
Other qualifications 10.7%
No qualifications 14.4%
Unemployment rates, which average 7.7%, by racial group were whites 7.1%, mixed race
17.2%; Asians 11.8%, blacks 17.3% and Chinese 4.2%. The unemployment rate of those
whose country of origin was outside the UK was 9.3%. According to the Eurobarometer
survey of individuals available #70.1, which surveyed respondents in the EU27 between
October and November 2008, the weighted EU27 average unemployment rates by
education attainment suggested unemployment rates of 4.7% for individuals who left
6 OECD (2008b), Jobs for Youth - United Kingdom, OECD, Paris
7 Source: ‘The employment situation’, Bureau of Labor Statistics, August 2009.
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm
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school at age 20 or higher and 9.0% for those who left school at a younger age.8
Unemployment rates were 7.6% for the indigenous populations and 11.1% for
immigrants. Table 4 provides evidence of unemployment rates by qualification across
OECD countries. It is quite clear that for all age groups and countries, unemployment
rates are higher for the least educated.
We now turn to examine very recent micro-data on unemployment in Europe, for Spring
2009. In Table 5, we make use of the data from Eurobarometer #71.2, which was taken
in May-June in the EU27 countries plus Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey. In total there
are nearly 30,000 observations. In column 1 we estimate a dprobit on the probability an
individual is unemployed, zero otherwise.9 The proportion of the total population that are
under the age of twenty five are two and a half percentage points higher than those aged
45-54 and lower than those aged 25-34. In part this arises because of the high proportion
of youngsters who are still studying. However, in column two, when the sample is
conditioned on being a member of the labour force, it is apparent that the unemployment
rate of the young is especially high. Unemployment is highest for the least educated,
minorities, those suffering from a chronic physical or mental health problem which
affects their daily activities and residents of Spain, Ireland, Croatia, East Germany,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Macedonia.
Column 3 estimates the probability that the respondent reports that they have lost a job of
the result of the economic crisis. The sample again includes the whole population and
once more the young are disproportionately hard hit. Men, the least educated, and
residents of Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Spain are most likely to report in the
affirmative.
Of interest also are the attitudes of the young employed to the possibility that they will
lose their job in the near term, and also if they did how hard it would be for them to find
another one. Column 4 estimates an ordered logit where the employed are asked how
confident they are in their 'ability to keep their job over the next few months'. The young
are especially confident. The result is similar in column 5 which models the likelihood a
worker could find a job if laid-off on a ten point scale where 1 is not at all likely and 10 is
very likely. The old, immigrants and the unhealthy are especially fearful of finding
another job. The young are especially optimistic that they could find a job if they were
laid-off.
Table 6 provides some explanation for the rise in youth unemployment. The youth
cohort is especially large at a time when the labor market is in the doldrums. The table
shows the size of four single age cohorts in comparison to the size of the cohort of twenty
8 Data are available on approximately 25,000 individuals in the workforce.
9 Dprobit fits maximum-likelihood probit models and is an alternative to probit. Rather than reporting the
coefficients, dprobit reports the marginal effect, that is the change in the probability for an infinitesimal
change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, reports the discrete change in the
probability for dummy variables.
6
year olds, which for simplicity is set to 100. In some countries twenty five year olds are
the largest group while for others, the maximum occurs at a different age. We find that
a) In some Western countries the number of twenty year olds is greater than the number
of twenty five year olds. Examples are the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy and
Denmark that have very high youth unemployment rates.
b) Significant exceptions to this finding are evident in Eastern Europe (Armenia, Belarus,
Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Russia and the Ukraine) that
have declining birth rates and hence aging populations.
c) The size of the youth cohort will quickly collapse, especially in Eastern Europe.
Over the next five years, based on the current number of fifteen year olds, there will be a
rapid decline in the number of twenty year olds. Progressively shrinking cohorts will
have even more dramatic effects on the number of entrants to the labour market in ten
and fifteen years time. The decline is relatively small in the US compared with other
countries, in part because of its relatively high rate of immigration. Immigrants tend to
be young. In ten years time in the Euro area the number of twenty year olds will have
dropped by twelve percent. In ten years, the size of the youth cohort is going to be
smaller in all European countries except Denmark, Luxembourg and Norway.
In summary, the recession has reversed recent reductions in youth unemployment in the
developed world. Like other groups on the margins of the labour market, the young tend
to experience particularly high rates of unemployment during recessions. The current
experience fits this pattern. However, the youth cohort is diminishing in size in most
countries, suggesting that, in the future, excess supply of younger workers is less likely to
be problematic.
3. Two Case studies - the United States and the United Kingdom
In this section, we investigate past and current labour market experience for younger
people using two large scale, micro-datasets workers in two countries - the United States
and the United Kingdom.
a) The youth labor market in the United States.
A great deal of what is known about the youth labor market comes from a series of
research volumes published by the National Bureau of Economic Research. These
volumes were based primarily, but not exclusively on research done in the United States
(Freeman and Wise, 1982; Blanchflower and Freeman, 2000).10 It is certainly a case of
10 Freeman, R. B. and D. A. Wise, (editors), The Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes, and
Consequences, University of Chicago Press and NBER. R.B. Freeman and H. J. Holzer, 'The Black Youth
Employment Crisis', University of Chicago Press and NBER, 1986 D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman
(editors), Youth Employment and Joblessness in Advanced Countries, University of Chicago Press and
NBER, 2000
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déjà vu in the United States, where the youth labour market crisis that occurred in the
1980s is now repeating itself.
As mentioned above, the size of the youth cohort in the US is not going to decline as fast
as in most other OECD countries, as was apparent from Table 6, partly due to
immigration. Immigrants tend to disproportionately be young and have more children.
Figure 1 illustrates.
Table 7 presents recent evidence on changes in labour market status of young people ages
16-24 in July of each year from 2006 to 2009. The youth labor force aged 16 to 24
working or actively looking for work grows sharply between April and July each year.
During these months, large numbers of high school and college students take or search
for summer jobs, and many graduates enter the labor market to look for, or begin,
permanent employment. In the summer of 2009, the youth labor force grew by 2.6
million to a total of 23.7 million. Consistent data are available for four years. A number
of findings stand out
1) Youth unemployment has grown rapidly in both levels and rates since 2007. At the
same time labour force participation rates and employment-population rates fell. Most
rapid growth was in youngsters looking for full-time jobs.
2) Unemployment rates were especially high for blacks (31.2% in 2009) and Hispanics
(21.7%).
3) Unemployment rates were higher for men than women.
Table 8 pursues further the issue of the characteristics of the young unemployed and how
these have changed over time in the United States. It reports the results of estimating a
dprobit where the dependent variable is one if the individual is unemployed, zero if
employed. Columns 1-3 make use of data from the Outgoing Rotation Group files of the
Current Population Survey for 1979; 1982-1983 pooled; 2007 and 2008 pooled. The
final column for 2009 makes use of data from the Basic Monthly files of the CPS, of
which the outgoing rotation group files are a subset. We choose these years to compare
the incidence of youth unemployment in this recession with that of the early 1980s. In
1979 the annual unemployment rate was 5.8% compared 9.7% in 1982 and 9.6% in 1983.
In 2007 it was 4.6% and 5.8% in 2008: it averaged 9% from January-September 2009.
Hence we can compare the changes that took place as the labour market went from boom
to bust in both recessions.
The raw data for the young are as follows. From boom to bust in both recessions impacts
the least educated, African Americans and especially African Americans who are high
school dropouts. This is confirmed in the regressions.
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US Unemployment rates % (weighted)
White Black Hispanic All
1979 9.9 26.3 13.3 11.9
High school dropout 17.5 36.4 18.4 19.9
1982-1983 14.8 36.8 21.9 17.8
High school dropout 25.9 53.1 31.8 29.7
Some college 9.0 26.9 12.2 10.8
2007-2008 9.6 19.6 12.3 11.3
High school dropout 16.8 31.6 17.1 18.8
2009 15.0 28.4 19.2 17.6
High school dropout 23.8 43.6 26.5 27.2
Some college 9.5 18.6 12.6 11.2
The probability of being unemployed is highest for those aged 16. Young blacks are
especially hard hit by recession. But up to 2009, the gap between whites and blacks in
terms of their relative unemployment rates is much less than in the 80s.
b) The nature of the youth labour market problem in the UK
The majority of youth unemployment in the UK is in the 18-24 age group (the young),
rather than in the 16-17 age group (the very young). For example, in 2009 Q3 there were
197,000 unemployed 16 and 17 year olds compared with 746,000 18-24 year olds. There
were half a million claimants of unemployment benefits, who were aged 18-24, but none
who were 16-17, as this age group is not eligible to claim unemployment benefits. The
representation of those aged less than 25 among the unemployed is much greater than
their representation in the overall population.11
Those unemployed aged 18-24 have increased as a share of total unemployment since the
turn of the millennium. As can be seen below, despite a declining overall unemployment
rate and a declining rate for the young between 1993 and 2004, their unemployment rate
has risen since then. Moreover, their share of unemployment has risen steadily from
21.7% in 1999 to 31.4% in 2008 but has fallen back a little at the end of 2009.
11 In 2007 15-24 year olds constituted 13.37% of the population and 20.15% of the population of working
age (15-64M/59F). See Table 1.4 Population Trends, No 134, Winter 2008.
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/Product.asp?vlnk=6303
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Unemployment rate 18-24 unemployment rate 18-24 as % overall
1993 10.4 17.5 25.0
1994 9.5 16.3 23.9
1995 8.6 15.0 23.1
1996 8.1 14.3 22.7
1997 6.9 12.9 22.3
1998 6.3 12.0 22.8
1999 6.0 11.2 21.7
2000 5.4 10.6 22.4
2001 5.1 10.4 23.9
2002 5.2 10.5 23.8
2003 5.1 10.6 24.8
2004 4.8 10.4 26.2
2005 4.9 11.0 27.8
2006 5.4 12.2 27.7
2007 5.3 12.3 28.3
2008 5.7 13.2 31.4
2009 Q3 7.8 18.0 30.3
Youth unemployment rates are particularly high for racial minorities. As we noted
above, black unemployment rates ages 18-24 were 26.3% and for Asians were 21.3%.
The rate for those without qualifications in the 2008 LFS was also high, at 28.9% and
47.4% for young blacks, 30.0% for young whites and 38.3% Asians respectively, without
qualifications. We have special concerns regarding the employment prospects of these
young people without qualifications- the disadvantaged young - going forward.
Table 9 reports the probability of a young person under 25 being unemployed using data
from the 1981 and 1983-1986 pooled Labour Force Surveys again using a dprobit
equation for unemployment. We chose these years as the unemployment rate was 9.6%
in 1981 - the start of the bust - compared with 11.5% in 1983; 11.8% in 1984; 11.4% in
1985 and 11.3% in 1986 - the bust itself. As in the USA, the incidence fell hardest on the
sixteen year olds, the least educated and minorities, and especially so for blacks.
Unemployment was highest in the bust in Tyne and Wear and lowest in the South East.
Table 10 performs a similar exercise with LFS data for the boom times - 2006 Q1 to 2008
Q1 and the bust, 2008 Q2 to 2009 Q3. Results are similar. Incidence in the bust is
highest among sixteen year olds, blacks and to a lesser extent Asians, and the least
educated and in Tyne and Wear once again, but also in the West Midlands. There is
evidence that university graduates have a higher incidence of unemployment than those
with higher education and A-levels or equivalent and that gap has widened recently. This
group will typically have less labour market experience than those with lower
qualifications. In a regression on all age groups, graduates have a significantly lower risk
of unemployment than the less well-qualified.
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Part of the explanation for the rise in youth unemployment in the UK has been the recent
rise in the size of the youth cohort discussed earlier. This is illustrated below:
Total UK population #16-24 year olds 16-24 as % total
('000s) ('000s)
1981 56,357 8,079 14.3%
1986 56,684 8,332 14.7%
1991 57,439 7,491 13.0%
1996 58,164 6,495 11.2%
2000 58,886 6,383 10.8%
2001 59,113 6,504 11.0%
2002 59,323 6,632 11.2%
2003 59,557 6,785 11.4%
2004 59,846 6,960 11.6%
2005 60,238 7,099 11.8%
2006 60,587 7,221 11.9%
2007 60,975 7,368 12.1%
Source: Population Trends, 134, Winter 2008, Table 1.4.
From 1980 to 2000 the absolute and relative size of the youth cohort shrank. However,
since 2000 the size of the youth cohort - the children of the baby boomers - has grown
steadily, from 6.4 million (10.8% of the population) in 2000 to 7.4 million (12.1%) in
2007. The growth of the 16-24 cohort has thus been faster than the overall growth in the
population. The number of 16-24 year olds in 2007 is still around seven hundred
thousand less than the number in 1981 (8.1 million). However, the size of that cohort
will decline quite rapidly. The following numbers are taken from Key Population and
Vital Statistics, 2006 and they show the numbers of children by single year of age (in
thousands) in mid 2006.
Age in 2006 Cohort size (‘000s) Age in 2006 Cohort size (‘000s)
0 732 13 759
1 716 14 785
2 705 15 800
3 681 16 791
4 663 17 791
5 664 18 809
6 680 19 805
7 700 20 810
8 713 21 825
9 732 22 808
10 728 23 793
11 732 24 788
12 749
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The growth of the age 16-24 cohort is a temporary phenomenon. It will start to decline in
absolute and relative size from 2009 onwards as the larger older cohorts drop out and the
younger smaller ones are added. For example, in 2009 there are approximately 825,000
24 year olds (age 21 in 2006) who will drop out and will be replaced by 749,000 fifteen
year olds (aged 12 in 2006) so the cohort will shrink by around 75,000. Analogously, it
will drop by a similar number the next year. Figure 2 illustrates the changing cohort sizes
in the UK.
Of particular concern also in the UK is the high proportion of young people who are not
in education employment or training (NEET). In 2009 Q3 there were 261,000 16-18 year
olds and 933,000 18-24 year olds classified as NEET.12 Overall 18% of 16-24 year olds
were in this category. Low-skilled youth who become NEET find it more difficult to re-
engage in employment and learning than 16-24-year olds on average and there is
evidence that they may become trapped in NEET. In October 2008 The Prince’s Trust,
conducted a survey of 2,004 16- to-25 year olds and found that 27% of NEETs reported
that life has 'no purpose', compared with 14% overall. Only 60% of NEETs said they
were happy compared with 71% for all young people.13
Godfrey et al (2002) estimated the costs of being NEET for the Department for Education
and Skills.14 They considered social costs as well as public finance costs over the current,
medium and long-term. These included estimates of the costs of educational
underachievement, unemployment, inactivity, crime and health. The authors were not
able to estimates of the costs of the lowering of the skills base and hence their findings
may underestimate the full costs. Their major finding was that the 157,000 NEETs aged
16-18 present in the UK population in 1999 would accrue additional lifetime costs of
around £7bn (2001 prices) in resource terms and £8.1bn in additional public spending.
The per capita equivalents are £45,000 in resource costs and £52,000 in public finance
costs.
4. Causes of Unemployment
The orthodox explanation of unemployment that argues that institutions matter has been
subject to fairly extensive econometric testing, and in recent years, the validity of the
empirical results supporting this view has been called into question.15 It has proved
difficult to estimate a set of cross-country panel unemployment regressions that contain a
12 See http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/STA/t000751/index.shtml
13
'The Prince’s Trust YouGov Youth Index', 2008
14 Godfrey, C., Hutton, S., Bradshaw, J., Coles, B., Craig, G. and Johnson, J., (2002), Estimating the Cost
of Being 'Not in Education, Employment or Training' at Age 16-18, Research Report 346, Department for
Education and Skills.
15 R. Layard, S.N. Nickell and R. Jackman (2005), Unemployment, macroeconomic performance and the
labour market, Oxford University Press, 2nd edition. S.N. Nickell (2006), 'A picture of European
unemployment: success and failure', in Structural unemployment in Western Europe, edited by M.
Werding, CESifo Seminar Series, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
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lagged unemployment rate and a full set of year and country dummies and show that any
of the labour market rigidity variables work. This is a crucial test. This is the first main
similarity between European labour markets: labour market institutions do not tend to
cause unemployment. The major exception is changes in the replacement rate, which, in
some specifications, do appear to be negatively correlated with changes in the
unemployment rate. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) have argued that “the interaction of
shocks and institutions does a good statistical job of fitting the evolution of
unemployment both over time and across countries.” This result is questionable because
it is obtained in an over-fitted model — few data points and lots of variables —and the
results appear to be driven by the cross-section variation rather than by any time series
changes.16 There are only eight time series data points as they use five-year averages
from 1960-1995.
As an illustration, we ran a pooled cross-country time series using the CEP/OECD
Institutions data for 1975-2002 for eighteen OECD countries (Australia; Austria;
Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Ireland; Italy; Japan;
Netherlands; Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; United Kingdom, and the United States).
We included controls for union density, the strictness of employment protection
legislation, gross benefit replacement rates data and the tax wedge.17 The dependent
variable was the log of the unemployment rate and the equation includes a full set of
country and year dummies. Coefficients and t-statistics are as follows. Only the lagged
dependent variable is significant in any specification, whether the model is run without
year dummies or country dummies (column 1); with year dummies (column 2) or both
country and year dummies (column 3). The 'flexibility' explanation of unemployment is
wrong.
(1) (2) (3)
Log of unemployment ratet-1 .9333 (80.39) .9415 (70.61) .9405 (72.11)
Union density -.0004 (0.91) -.0006 (1.52) .0011 (0.89)
Employment protection .0376 (1.62) .0118 (0.55) -.0442 (0.77)
Benefits -.0002 (0.24) -.0002 (0.35) -.0002 (0.21)
Tax wedge .0002 (0.24) .0009 (1.06) .0030 (1.62)
Year dummies No Yes Yes
Country dummies No No Yes
R2 .9434 .9540 .9647
N 480 480 480
(Dependent variable =log of unemployment ratet).
In a recent article, Howell et al (2007) econometrically examined the impact of these
rigidity variables, or what they call Protective Labor Market Institutions (PLMIs), and
16 Blanchard, O., and Wolfers, J. (2000), 'The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of European
unemployment: the aggregate evidence', Economic Journal, 110 (462) 1–33.
17 The names in parentheses are variable names as explained in W. Nickell (2006), 'The CEP – OECD
Institutions Data Set (1960-2004)', Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, September.
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concluded that: “while significant impacts for employment protection, benefit generosity,
and union strength have been reported, the clear conclusion from our review of these
studies is that the effects for the PLMIs is clearly not robust, with widely divergent
coefficients and levels of significance.” Indeed, in his published comments on the Howell
et al. article, Jim Heckman (2007) argues that the authors “…are convincing in showing
the fragility of the evidence on the role of labour market institutions in explaining the
pattern of European unemployment, using standard econometric methodology.”
Freeman (2007) also finds the evidence for the impact of these institutional variables less
than convincing “despite considerable effort, researchers have not pinned down the
effects, if any, of institutions on other aggregate economic outcomes, such as
unemployment and employment”.18 In a recent article, Horst Feldmann examined how
the quality of industrial relations affects unemployment in developing countries and
found relatively moderate effects, especially for females.19
There is no evidence in any country over the last year or so that union density, benefits,
the tax wedge or employment protection has risen. Western Europe has more job
protection, higher unemployment benefits, more union power, and a more generous
welfare state and it has experienced a smaller rise in unemployment than the United
States during the current recession. The US unemployment rate rose above that in the EU
during 2009 - the first time it had done so for many years.
The increases in unemployment we have observed in the OECD over the last year or so
are not due to decreases in labour market flexibility. It is not that frictions in the market
have increased: rather, there has been a collapse in the demand for labour as product
demand has fallen, which in turn reflects severe credit rationing, falling consumer
confidence, responses to transitory shocks in raw materials prices and delayed response
by monetary authorities to these developments. None of these issues directly impinge on
the labour market or on the extent to which institutional arrangements affect its
efficiency. It is the fall in demand for labour that is the culprit.
5. The Impact of Unemployment – What We Know From the Literature
1) Unemployment is a stressful life event that makes people unhappy.20 Increases in the
unemployment rate lower the happiness of everyone, not just the unemployed. The fear
of becoming unemployed in the future lowers a person’s subjective wellbeing.21
18 D. Howell, D. Baker, A. Glyn and J. Schmitt (2007), 'Are protective labour market institutions at the root
of unemployment? A critical review of the evidence', Capitalism and Society, 2(1), pp. 171. Heckman, J.
(2007), 'Comments on 'Are protective labour market institutions at the root of unemployment? A critical
review of the evidence by David Howell, Dean Baker, Andrew Glyn and John Schmitt', Capitalism and
Society, 2(1), Article 5, pp. 15. R.B. Freeman (2007), 'Labor market institutions around the world', NBER
WP#13242. D.G. Blanchflower (2001), 'Unemployment, wellbeing and wage curves in Eastern and
Central Europe', Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 15(4), pp. 364-402.
19 H. Feldmann (2009), 'The quality of industrial relations and unemployment in developing countries',
Review of Development Economics, 13(1), pp. 56–69.
20 L. Winkelmann and R. Winkelmann (1998), 'Why are the unemployed so unhappy? Evidence from
panel data', Economica, 65(257), pp. 1-15. A.E. Clark and A.J. Oswald (1994), 'Unhappiness and
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2) Unemployment increases susceptibility to malnutrition, illness, mental stress, and loss
of self-esteem, leading to depression.22 Goldsmith, Veum and Darity (1996, 1997)
found, for example, using data from the US national Longitudinal Study of Youth
(NLSY) that being jobless injures self-esteem, and fosters feelings of externality and
helplessness among youths. Moreover, they also found evidence that the psychological
imprint of joblessness persists. The unemployed also appear to have a higher propensity
to commit suicide23. Further, unemployment can reduce the life expectancy of workers.24
An additional negative medical indication is that unemployment increases the probability
of poor physical health outcomes such as heart attacks in later life.25
unemployment', Economic Journal, 104(424), pp. 648-659. B.S. Frey and A. Stutzer (2002), Happiness
and Economics, Princeton University Press. Ahn, N., J.R. García and J.F. Jimeno (2004), 'The impact of
unemployment on individual well-being in the EU', European Network of Economic Policy Institutes,
Working Paper No 29.
21 Di Tella R., MacCulloch R.J. and A.J. Oswald (2001), 'Preferences over inflation and unemployment:
evidence from surveys of happiness', American Economic Review, 91, pp. 335-341. Di Tella R.,
MacCulloch R.J. and A.J. Oswald (2003), 'The macroeconomics of happiness', Review of Economics and
Statistics, 85, 809-827. D. G. Blanchflower (2007), 'Is unemployment more costly than inflation?', NBER
Working Paper W13505, October. D.G. Blanchflower, David (1991), 'Fear, unemployment and pay
flexibility', Economic Journal, 101, pp. 483-496. A. Knabe and S. Rätzel (2008), 'Scarring or scaring? The
psychological impact of past and future unemployment', Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg,
February 21.
22 M. Linn, R. Sandifer and S. Stein (1985), 'Effects of unemployment on mental and physical health',
American Journal of Public Health, 75, pp. 502-506. M. Frese and G. Mohr (1987), 'Prolonged
unemployment and depression in older workers: a longitudinal study of intervening variables, Social
Science and Medicine, 25, pp. 173-178. P. Jackson and P. Warr (1987), 'Mental health of unemployed men
in different parts of England and Wales', British Medical Journal, 295, p. 525. M.H. Banks and P.R.
Jackson (1982), 'Unemployment and the risk of minor psychiatric disorder in young people: cross-sectional
and longitudinal evidence', Psychological Medicine, 12, pp. 789-798. Darity, W.R. Jr. and A.H. Goldsmith
(1996), 'Social psychology, unemployment and macroeconomics', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(1),
Winer, pp. 121-140. A.H. Goldsmith, J.R. Veum and W. Darity (1996), 'The psychological impact of
unemployment and joblessness', Journal of Socio-Economics, 25(3), April, pp. 333-358. A.H. Goldsmith,
J.R. Veum and W. Darity (1997), 'Unemployment, joblessness, psychological well-being and self-esteem:
theory and evidence', Journal of Socio-Economics, 26(2), April, pp. 133-158. M.H. Brenner and A.
Mooney (1983), Unemployment and health in the context of economic change', Social Science and
Medicine, 17(16), pp. 1125-1138.
23 Platt, S. (1984) ‘Unemployment and suicidal behaviour: A review of the literature.’ Social Science &
Medicine. Vol 19(2), pp 93-115. T A Blakely, S C D Collings, J Atkinson (2003) ‘Unemployment and
suicide. Evidence for a causal association?’ Journal of Epidemiological Community Health; 57, pp 594-
600
24 Brenner and Mooney (1984) ibid, K.A. Moser, P.O. Goldblatt, A.J. Fox and D.R. Jones (1987),
'Unemployment and mortality: comparison of the 1971 and 1981 longitudinal study census samples',
British Medical Journal; 1, pp.86-90. K.A. Moser, P.O. Goldblatt, A.J. Fox and D.R. Jones (1990),
'Unemployment and mortality' in: Goldblatt P., editor. Longitudinal study: mortality and social
organisation. London: OPCS, 1990. (Series LS No. 6.)
25 N. Beale and S. Nethercott (1987), 'The health of industrial employees four years after compulsory
redundancy', Journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners, 37 pp. 390-394. L. Iverson and S.
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3) The long-term unemployed are at a particular disadvantage trying to find work. The
effects of unemployment appear to depend a lot on how long the person has been
unemployed.26 People's morale sinks as the duration of unemployment rises. Long-term
unemployment is especially harmful.
4) Unemployment while young, especially of long duration, causes permanent scars
rather than temporary blemishes.27 For the young a spell of unemployment does not end
with that spell; it raises the probability of being unemployed in later years and has a wage
penalty. These effects are much larger than for older people. Ellwood (1982) examined
the persistence and long-term impacts of early labor force experiences. He reports a rise
in employment rates for a cohort of young men as they age, but points out that those
persons with poor employment records early have comparatively poor records later. The
paper found that the effects of a period without work do not end with that spell. A
teenager who spends time out of work in one year will probably spend less time working
in the next than he would have had he worked the entire year. Furthermore, Ellwood
concluded that the lost work experience was reflected in considerably lower wages. The
reduced employment effects Ellwood examined appeared to die off very quickly. What
appeared to persist were effects of lost work experience on wages.
More recently Mroz and Savage (2006) reached a similar conclusion using data from the
NLSY for the US and also found evidence of long-lived blemishes from unemployment.
A six month spell of unemployment at age 22 would result in an 8 per cent lower wage at
23 and even at ages 30 and 31 wages were 2-3 per cent lower than they otherwise would
have been. Kletzer and Fairlie (1999) also using data for the US estimate that for young
unemployed workers the costs of job loss in terms of annual earnings are 8.4% and
13.0%, for boys and girls, respectively.28
Gregg and Tominey (2005) found using data from the NCDS for the UK that there was a
significant wage penalty of youth unemployment even after controlling for education,
Sabroe (1988), 'Participation in a follow-up study of health among unemployed and employed people after
a company closedown: drop outs and selection bias,' Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 42:
396-401. I. Mattiasson, F. Lindgarde, J.A. Nilsson and T. Theorell (1990), 'Threats of unemployment and
cardiovascular risk factors: longitudinal study of quality of sleep and serum cholesterol concentrations in
men threatened with redundancy', British Medical Journal, 301, pp. 461-466.
26 Blanchard, O. (1989) ‘Hysteresis in Unemployment’, European Economic Review, 31, 1/2, pp. 288-295.
Røed, Knut, ‘Hysteresis in Unemployment’ Journal of Economic Surveys, 11, 4, December, pp. 389-418
London: Blackwell Publishing
27 David Ellwood (1982), 'Teenage Unemployment: Permanent Scars or Temporary Blemishes?' in The
Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes and Consequences, edited by Richard B. Freeman and
David A. Wise, pp. 349-390. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982
28 T.A. Mroz and T.H. Savage (2006), 'The long-term effects of youth unemployment', Journal of Human
Resources, Spring, 41(2), pp. 259-293. R. Fairlie and L.G. Kletzer (2003), 'The long-term costs of job
displacement among young workers,' Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56(4), pp. 682-698.
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region and a wealth of family and personal characteristics. Their results suggested a scar
from youth unemployment of 13-21% age 41 although this penalty was lower at 9-11% if
individuals avoid repeat exposure.29 Gregg (2001) also used NCDS data to show that
unemployment experience up to the age of 23 drives unemployment in subsequent
years.30
Arulampalam (2001) found that joblessness leaves permanent scars on people and
reduces the probability of employment and future earnings and increases the risk of
future unemployment. She found that a spell of unemployment carries a wage penalty of
6% on re-entry in Britain, and after three years, they are earning 14% less compared to
what they would have received absent unemployment. Arulampalam et al (2000) also
found evidence of unemployment persistence, especially for young men. Narendranathan
and Elias (1993) also find evidence of state dependence and report that ‘the odds of
becoming unemployed are 2.3 times higher for youths who were unemployed last year
than for youths who were not unemployed’ (p.183). Arulampalam et al. (2001) also
report that the best predictor of an individual's future risk of unemployment is his past
history of unemployment. They find that unemployment has a scarring effect for both
future unemployment and future earnings. In addition Burgess et al. (1999) find that
unemployment while young raises the probability of subsequent unemployment, but the
size of any effect varies by skill level.31 We present some new evidence of our own on
this important topic in the next section.
5) As unemployment rates increase, crime rates tend to rise, especially property crime.32
Indeed, there is some recent evidence that property crime has now started to increase in
29 P.A. Gregg and E. Tominey (2005), 'The wage scar from male youth unemployment', Labour Economics,
12, pp. 487-509
30 P. Gregg (2001), 'The impact of youth unemployment on adult unemployment in NCDS', Economic
Journal, 111(475), pp. F623-F653.
31 W. Arulampalam (2001), 'Is unemployment really scarring? Effects of unemployment experiences on
wages', Economic Journal, (111), November, pp: F585-F606. W. Narendranathan and P. Elias (1993),
‘Influences of past history on the incidence of youth unemployment: empirical findings for the UK’,
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 55, pp. 161-185. W. Arulampalam, A. Booth and M. Taylor
(2000), ‘Unemployment persistence’, Oxford Economic Papers, 52, pp. 24-50. S. Burgess, C. Propper, H.
Rees and A. Shearer (2003), 'The class of 1981: the effects of early career unemployment on subsequent
unemployment experiences, Labour Economics, 10(3), June, pp. 291-309. For a useful summary of the
school to work transition see S. Bradley and Nguyen, A.N. (2004), 'The school-to-work transition'. In: G.
Johnes and J. Johnes (Eds.), International Handbook on the Economics of Education. Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, Glos.
32 T. Thornberry and R. Christensen (1984), 'Unemployment and criminal involvement. An investigation
of reciprocal causal structures', American Sociological Review, 56, pp. 609-627. M. Lin (2008), 'Does
unemployment increase crime? Evidence from US data, 1974-2000', Journal of Human Resources, 43(2),
Spring, pp. 413-436. S. Raphael and R. Winter-Ebmer (2001), 'Identifying the effect of unemployment on
crime', Journal of Law and Economics, 44(1), pp. 259-283. D. Fougere, F. Kramarz and J. Pouget (2006)
'Youth unemployment and crime in France', CEPR Discussion paper # 5600. For a discussion of the
relationship between unemployment and crime see R.B. Freeman (1999), 'The economics of crime', in
Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3C, edited by O.C. Ashenfelter and D. Card, North Holland.
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the UK. According to the British Crime Survey for the period July to September 2008,
police recorded domestic burglaries rose by four per cent.33 Thornberry and Christensen
(1984), for example, find evidence that a cycle develops whereby involvement in crime
reduces subsequent employment prospects which then raises the likelihood of
participating in crime.
Fougere et al (2006) find that increases in youth unemployment causes increases in
burglaries, thefts and drug offences. Hansen and Machin (2002) find a statistically
significant negative relationship between the number of offences reported by the police
over a two year period for property and vehicle crime and the proportion of workers paid
beneath the minimum before its introduction.34 Hence, there are more crime reductions
in areas that initially, had more low-wage workers. Falk and Zweimuller (2005) find a
significant positive relation between unemployment and right-wing criminal activities.
Carmichael and Ward (2001) found in Great Britain that youth unemployment and adult
unemployment are both significantly and positively related to burglary, theft, fraud and
forgery and total crime rates. For each of these offence categories the relationship
between youth unemployment and the specific crime was found to be somewhat stronger.
Carmichael and Ward (200) found that there is a systematic positive relationship between
burglary rates and male unemployment regardless of age.35
6) The youth labour market is highly cyclically sensitive. There is a considerable body of
evidence suggesting that the young, the least educated and especially minorities are
hardest in a recession.36 Youth unemployment rates continue to be more sensitive to
business-cycle conditions than the adult unemployment rate, as many studies have shown
(OECD, 2008).37 Young unskilled men from minority groups are thus particularly hard
hit. This is true around the world.
Clark and Summers (1982), in their classic study of the dynamics of youth joblessness
33 Crime in England and Wales Quarterly Update to September 2008, Home Office Statistical Bulletin,
Second Edition 01/09, Home Office, 22nd January 2009.
34 K. Hansen and S. Machin (2002), 'Spatial crime patterns and the introduction of the UK Minimum
Wage', Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 64, pp. 677-699.
35 A. Falk and J. Zweimuller (2005), ‘Unemployment and right-wing extremist crime’ CEPR Discussion
Paper #4997. F. Carmichael and R. Ward (2001), ‘Male unemployment and crime in England and Wales’,
Economics Letters, 73, pp. 111–115. F. Carmichael and R. Ward (2000), ‘Youth unemployment and crime
in the English regions and Wales’, Applied Economics, 32(5), April, pp. 559 – 571.
36 D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman (editors), Youth Employment and Joblessness in Advanced
Countries, University of Chicago Press and NBER, 2000 and Freeman, R. B. and D. A. Wise, (editors), The
Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes, and Consequences, University of Chicago Press and
NBER, 1982.
37 OECD (2008a), ‘Off to a good start? Youth labour market transitions in OECD countries’, OECD
Employment Outlook, 2008, pp. 25-77, Paris, France.
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argue that the problem of teenage unemployment arises from a shortage of jobs.
"Aggregate demand has a potent impact on the job prospects and market experience of
teenagers" (1982, p.230).38 Freeman and Wise (1982), for example, found in their study
of youth joblessness in the 1970s that it was concentrated, by and large, among a small
group who lacked work for extended periods of time.39 Over half of the male teenage
unemployment they examined was among those who were out of work for over six
months, a group constituting less than 10% of the youth labor force and only 7% of the
youth population. Freeman and Wise reported that the youths who make up the relatively
small group that was chronically without work had distinctive characteristics, They were
disproportionately black; disproportionately high school dropouts, and disproportionately
residents of poverty areas.  
Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) identified one basic pattern in the job market for
young workers: the disproportionately large response of youth employment or
unemployment to changes in overall unemployment.40 They argued that the sensitivity of
youth employment and unemployment to the overall rate of unemployment dominate
sizable demographic and structural changes favorable to youth in determining how
youths fare in the job market. This was also confirmed in Blanchflower and Freeman
(1996) and Makeham (1980).41 Recently OECD (2008a) confirmed this conclusion
"Youth unemployment rates are more sensitive to business-cycle conditions than the
adult unemployment rate and this high-sensitivity tends to decline progressively with
age".42
There is also evidence that young people do especially well in booms. Freeman and
Rodgers (1999) who analyzed the 1990s boom in the United States and found that it
substantially improved the position of non-college educated young men, especially young
African Americans who are the most disadvantaged and troubled group in the US.43
Young men in tight labor markets experienced a substantial boost in both employment
38 K.B. Clark and L.H. Summers (1982) 'The dynamics of youth unemployment' in Freeman, R. B. and D.
A. Wise, (editors), The Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes, and Consequences, University of
Chicago Press and NBER.
39 Richard B. Freeman and David A. Wise (1982), 'The youth labor market problem: its nature causes and
consequences:' in Freeman, R. B. and D. A. Wise, (editors), The Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature,
Causes, and Consequences, University of Chicago Press and NBER.
40 D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman (2000).
41 D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman (1996), 'Growing into Work: Youth and the Labour Market over
the 1980s and 1990s', OECD Employment Outlook, OECD, Paris and P. Makeham (1980), 'Youth
unemployment. An examination of evidence on youth unemployment using national statistics', Department
of Employment Research Paper No. 10, London.
42 OECD (2008a), 'Off to a good start? Youth labour market transitions in OECD countries', OECD
Employment Outlook, OECD, Paris.
43 Freeman, R.B. and W.M. Rodgers (1999), ‘Area economic conditions and the labor market outcomes of
young men in the 1990s expansion’, NBER Working Paper #7073, Cambridge, MA.
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and earnings. Adult men had no gains and their earnings barely changed even in areas
where unemployment rates were below 4%. Youths did particularly well in areas that
started the boom at lower jobless rates suggesting they would “benefit especially from
consistent full employment” (Freeman and Rodgers, 1999, p.2). As unemployment
amongst the young goes down and the attractiveness of work increases, because there are
more jobs and better paying jobs out there and it becomes a virtuous cycle. Freeman and
Rodgers found evidence that once that occurred in the US the crime rate dropped.
Increase aggregate demand and youths, especially disadvantaged youths, seem to do best
in booms.
We have investigated another aspect of cyclical sensitivity – whether the demand for
younger workers’ labour falls at the intensive margin as well as the extensive margin of
the labour market during recessions. Those aged 16-24 typically work shorter hours than
prime-age workers. But we were unable to identify any significant reduction in these
hours during the current recession, conditional on their other characteristics. To establish
this, we used the most recent nineteen quarters of the UK LFS. The data cover the period
to Q3 2009, and therefore include 7 “recession” quarters – when unemployment was
rising. We conducted regressions for both males and females distinguishing the pre-
recession and recession periods, younger and prime-age workers. Total weekly hours
(basic and overtime) was the dependent variable. Conditional on industry sector, region
and manual/non-manual status, we were unable to establish that the interaction of
younger workers with the recession period was significantly different from zero. Thus,
though we did show that the current recession had significant negative effects on all
workers hours, we found no evidence that younger workers hours are falling faster than
those of prime age workers.
6. Unemployment and the Youth Labour Market
In this section, we make four contributions to the literature on youth unemployment, all
of which use evidence from the current recession. First, we show that youths have not
priced themselves out of jobs, reinforcing the message that lack of demand is the primary
cause behind the recent rise in unemployment. Second, we show that polarization of the
labour market may adversely affect young peoples’ progression through the labour
market. Third, we present new evidence on happiness of the young. Finally, we present
further evidence that unemployment while young creates permanent scars.
a) Are youths pricing themselves out of jobs?
There has been considerable interest in the possibility that youth have priced themselves
out of jobs. Wells (1983) examined the relative pay and employment of young people for
the period 1952-1979. During the earlier period the pay of boys to men increased from
42.0 in 1952 to 46.9 in 1969 and for girls to men it fell from 34.0 to 32.4. However,
during the period 1969-1981 the boys to men ratio rose from 46.9 to 56.2 while the girls
to men ratio increased from 32.5 to 40.4. Econometric analysis confirmed the finding
found that the pay and employment of young people under the age of 18 for the period
1969-81 "appears to have been reduced by increases in their relative earnings relative to
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the average earnings of adults....No such effect could be found for the period 1952-1969"
(p.1).44
Subsequently the relative earnings of youth have declined steadily. OECD (1986) found
that from the 1970s through the early 1980s the earnings of youth fell relative to the
earnings of adults in several countries.45 The finding that youths were overpriced relative
to adults has not been replicated in subsequent periods, as youth relative wages have
fallen steadily. Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) examined the relative earnings of
youths aged 16-19 and 20-24 to those of adults in 11 OECD countries (Australia; Canada;
Denmark; France; Germany; Italy; Japan; Norway; Sweden; the United Kingdom and the
United States) and found that there were declines in the relative earnings of the young
throughout the 1990s in each of these countries except Sweden, despite the fact that the
size of the youth cohort was shrinking. O'Higgins (1997) also concluded that there was
no close relationship between the relative wages of youth and their unemployment rates.
"Indeed, the impression is that, more often than not, unemployment and relative wage
rates appear to be moving in opposite directions to each other".46
The finding that the relative pay of the young has continued to decline over the last
decade or so is confirmed below for the UK using data from Annual Survey of Hours and
Earnings (ASHE) - previously the New Earnings Survey (NES). Gross hourly earnings of
18-21 year olds are compared to overall earnings and adults age 40-49 for the period
1997-2008. It is clear that the relative earnings of the young have fallen steadily since
1997 when the youth share of total unemployment started to rise.
18-21/total 18-21/40-49 years
2008 51.8% 45.8%
2007 52.5% 46.6%
2006 51.3% 45.3%
2005 51.1% 45.0%
2004 52.0% 46.2%
2003 52.6% 46.2%
2002 52.8% 47.6%
2001 53.7% 48.4%
2000 53.7% 47.8%
1999 55.6% 49.6%
1998 54.6% 48.5%
1997 54.9% 48.6%
Source: ASHE.
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/Product.asp?vlnk=13101&Pos=1&ColRank=1&Rank=208
44 W. Wells (1983), 'The relative pay and employment of young people', Department of Employment
Occasional Paper # 42.
45 OECD (1986), OECD Employment Outlook, OECD, Paris, France.
46 N. O'Higgins (1997), 'The challenge of youth unemployment', Employment and labour market policies
branch action programme on youth unemployment ', ILO, Geneva.
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OECD (2008a) presented evidence on youth (20-24) earnings relative to adult earnings
across countries. The evidence is presented below and suggests that a) this ratio in the
UK has fallen over time and b) now is below the OECD average but was above it in
1996.
2006 1996
Australia .73 .74
Canada .64 .62
Denmark .65 .72
Finland .68 .70
Germany .61 .62
Ireland .67 .61
Japan .60 .62
New Zealand .75 .75
Sweden .68 .73
UK .60 .68
USA .57 .58
OECD .64 .67
The evidence that suggests that the high relative wages of the young is responsible for
pricing them out of the jobs comes only from the 1970s. This is the period of most rapid
increase in union activity. Union membership peaked in the 1970s with union density –
the proportion of workers who are members of trade unions - at a little over 50%
(Lindsay, 2003). Since that time union membership numbers and density rates have
fallen. In 2007 union density had fallen to 25% and 15.9% among private sector British
employees. Unions generally operate rates for the job, which would have the effect of
raising the relative wage of the young, and hence making them relatively less attractive,
and then lowering their employment. Union membership rates among the young in the
UK are especially low. Blanchflower (2007) shows, using data from the LFS that union
density rates for 16-19 year olds in 2004 were 4.3%. In 2007 the union density rates for
16-24 year olds was 9.8% (Mercer and Notley, 2008, Table 25).47 It does not appear that
youths are pricing themselves out of work currently, unless their relative productivity is
falling especially sharply, but we have no evidence to suggest that this is the case. But
this may change as unemployment rises.
A further possibility is that the National Minimum Wage, which was introduced in the
UK in 1997, might have reduced employment of the young. There is little or no evidence
47 C. Lindsay (2003), ‘A century of labour market change: 1900-2000’, Labour Market Trends, March, pp.
133-144. S. Mercer and R. Notley (2008), Trade Union Membership, 2007, July., Department of Business,
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, http://stats.berr.gov.uk/UKSA/tu/tum2008.pdf. D.G. Blanchflower
(2007), ‘International patterns of union membership', British Journal of Industrial Relations, March, 45(1),
pp. 1-28.
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to sustain that claim either.48 There is some evidence to suggest that the influx of
workers, who were generally working in less skilled jobs, from the ten Accession
countries did have some negative impact in the period since 2004 on the employment of
the least skilled young people.49 But these effects are usually insignificant or when
significant, quite small.
b) How is industrial change impacting young people's labour market prospects?
The changing structure of labour demand may also be adversely affect young people’s
labour market prospects. Autor, Levy and Murnane argue that industrial change in the
USA has led to a significant change in the demand for skills.50 Rather than additions to
labour demand being entirely focused on high-skilled jobs, there has been some increase
in demand for low-skilled workers. Many such jobs involve non-routine or interactive
tasks that cannot be easily automated. In contrast, the demand for skilled workers has
fallen, mainly as a result of automation. Such workers might typically have expected to
earn wages close to the central deciles of the earnings distribution. Goos and Manning
(2003) produce evidence supporting this hypothesis for the UK.51 They use information
from the LFS for the period 1979-1999 and define “lousy” jobs as those
occupation/industry combinations where median earnings are relatively low and “lovely”
jobs as those where median earnings are relatively high. They argue that both these types
of jobs typically involve tasks that are not routine and therefore cannot be easily
substituted by technology. Examples of “lousy” jobs might be care workers or gardeners,
while lawyers or cell biologists could be said to work in “lovely” jobs. They then show
that such non-routine jobs have exhibited the most rapid employment growth from 1979-
1999, with the most rapidly growing occupations being care workers, software engineers
and management consultants.
48 Metcalf, D. (2008), 'Why has the British National Minimum Wage had little or no impact on
employment?', Journal of Industrial Relations, 50 (3), June. R. Dickens and M. Draca (2005), 'The
employment effects of the October 2003 increase in the National Minimum Wage', CEP, February.
Dickens, R., and Manning, A. (2003) ‘Minimum Wage – Minimum Impact’, in Dickens, R., Gregg, P. and
Wadsworth, J. (eds.), The State of Working Britain, Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, pp 17-31 Report
prepared for Low Pay Commission. M. Stewart (2002a) ‘Estimating the impact of the minimum wage
using geographical wage variation’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 64, pp. 583-605. M.
Stewart (2002a) ‘The employment effects of the National Minimum Wage’, Economic Journal, 114,
March, pp. C110)-C116. M. Stewart (2004), ‘The impact of the introduction of the UK minimum wage on
the employment probabilities of low wage workers’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2, pp.
67-97.
49 Blanchflower, D.G. and C. Shadforth (2009) ibid. S. Nickell and J. Saleheen (2008), 'The impact of
immigration on occupational wages: evidence from Britain', Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Working
Paper # 08-6.
50 Autor, D. H, Levy, F. and R.J. Murnane (2003), 'The skill content of recent technological change: an
empirical exploration,' Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVIII, 1279-1333
51 Goos, M. and Manning, A. (2007), 'Lousy and lovely jobs: the rising polarization of work in Britain',
Review of Economics and Statistics, February, 89, pp. 118-133.
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To see if this process continued when the UK labour market was experiencing significant
growth, we repeat the Goos and Manning exercise for the period 2002 to 2008, again
using LFS data. The occupational classification used in the LFS is consistent over this
period. We subdivided the 2464 occupation/industry cells for which we had earnings data
into deciles based on the 2002 earnings distribution. We also calculated employment in
2002 and 2008 in each cell and aggregated for each earnings decile. Finally, we
calculated employment growth rates by decile using the 2002 and 2008 employment
levels. We also calculated the proportion of 16-24 year olds employed in the same
occupation/industry cells and aggregated across the income deciles to show how far this
age group is concentrated in “lovely” or “lousy” jobs.
Most of the growth in employment between 2002 and 2008 was concentrated in jobs that
would be classified as “good”, because of the relatively high wages that they pay.
Positive employment growth was recorded from the 7th to the 10th decile (see Figure 3).
Consistent with the Autor, Levy and Murnane argument, there was a significant decline
in employment in those jobs around the centre of the earnings distribution. At the bottom
end the picture is more mixed. A small decline in the first decile is more than offset by a
large rise in employment among those in the second decile of occupation/industry
combinations. The net effect is a modest increase in employment for those whose skills
place them at the lower end of the earnings distribution. Thus, although, we cannot
demonstrate a causal link between the declining occupations where technical change has
reduced employment opportunities, our evidence is consistent with both Autor and
Manning.
Figure 3 also shows that younger people (those aged 16-24) are predominantly associated
with jobs at the lower end of this distribution. Over 20 per cent of those employed in jobs
located in the lowest earnings decile are aged 16-24, while only 2.2 per cent are
employed in the top ten percent of occupations. Together, these results illustrate a key
difficulty for the current youth labour market. Most young people enter the labour market
in low-paying occupation/industry combinations, in which there has been a modest
growth in employment. They may aspire to enhance their earnings by moving into better
paying jobs. However, the route from lower-quality to better-quality jobs is becoming
more difficult in the in the sense that employment is falling among those jobs paying
around the median wage. Hence the probability of transition to better quality jobs is
reduced. Thus, the young face an increasingly polarised labour market. This finding may
well have implications for the design of labour market interventions designed to help the
young.
c) Happiness and the young
There is a growing body of research that finds that young people are especially happy.
Indeed, it appears that there is a U-shape in age in happiness equations across countries.52
There is also evidence to suggest that, in contrast to adults, the happiness of the young
52 D.G. Blanchflower and A.J. Oswald (2008), 'Is Well-Being U-Shaped over the Life Cycle?', Social
Science & Medicine, 2008, 66(6), pp. 1733-1749 and D.G. Blanchflower and A.J. Oswald (2009), 'The U-
Shape Without Controls: A response to Glenn', Social Science and Medicine, .
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has trended up over time. Recently, though, the happiness of the young appears to have
fallen. In the US General Social Survey the distribution of responses to the question how
happy are you, suggests that there was a drop in the happiness of the young in 2008.
% very happy % quite happy % not too happy
1996 27 62 11
1998 26 59 15
2000 28 63 9
2002 29 56 15
2004 32 55 13
2006 27 60 13
2008 24 58 18
Average 28 59 12
Similarly, in the Eurobarometer there has also been a drop in the happiness of the young.
We compared the average weighted life satisfaction scores based on a scale of 1-4 from
Eurobarometer #71.1 for January-February 2009 and compared it with the results from
the same question asked in Eurobarometer #68.1 taken between September and October
2007, at the height of the boom. Results are shown below.
2007 2009 Change
Austria 3.07 3.20 -0.13
Belgium 3.25 3.35 -0.10
Bulgaria 2.62 2.66 -0.04
Cyprus 3.36 3.49 -0.13
Czech Republic 3.05 3.13 -0.08
Denmark 3.60 3.68 -0.08
East Germany 2.84 2.81 +0.03
Estonia 2.91 3.05 -0.14
Finland 3.30 3.32 -0.01
France 3.10 3.27 -0.17
Great Britain 3.33 3.32 0.00
Greece 2.64 2.89 -0.25
Hungary 2.62 2.64 -0.01
Ireland 3.09 3.27 -0.17
Italy 2.78 2.86 -0.08
Latvia 2.64 2.99 -0.35
Lithuania 2.78 3.00 -0.22
Luxembourg 3.42 3.42 0.00
Malta 3.19 2.98 +0.21
Netherlands 3.56 3.61 -0.04
Poland 2.94 3.15 -0.21
Portugal 2.60 2.87 -0.28
Romania 2.81 2.65 +0.16
Slovakia 2.95 2.92 +0.03
Slovenia 3.20 3.50 -0.30
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Spain 3.22 3.27 -0.05
Sweden 3.46 3.34 +0.12
Turkey 2.76 3.01 -0.25
West Germany 3.08 3.14 -0.07
The happiness scores of the young fell in twenty-two out of twenty nine countries as
unemployment increased. But increases were found in Romania (+.16) and Sweden
(+.12).
Table 12 allows us to examine how unemployment impacts the happiness of the young in
Europe using data for 2009 from Eurobarometer #71.1 for 2009 used above. Column 1
estimates an ordered logit where the dependent variable is how satisfied the individual is
with the life they lead, in four categories. A positive coefficient implies happier. It is
apparent, consistent with the literature (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004, Blanchflower,
2009) that happiness is U-shaped in age - in this case lowest for the age group 45-54 and
highest for the young. Happiness is lower among men, the least educated, separated and
people who had previously been living together but were single at time of interview and
right-wingers. The Danes, Swedes and Dutch were especially happy and young people
from Eastern Europe and Greece were particularly unhappy.
Unemployment lowers people's happiness. The effect is less for the young than older
individuals. This is shown by the positive and significant interaction term between
unemployment and ages 15-24 dummy in the first column. The second column is
restricted to youngsters only and the unemployment result remains. Unemployment
makes young people unhappy but less so than for adults. These results arte confirmed in
the final two columns that estimate ordered logits relating to an individual's 'job'.
Table 13 performs a similar exercise, estimating a series of life satisfaction equations for
the United States using data for 2008 from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
survey (BRFSS). For earlier work with these data see Oswald and Wuh (2009) and
Blanchflower (2009).53 RHS controls are as in Table 12 for Europe, along with controls
for states plus Guam, US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico; although here the sample does
not include youngsters under the age of eighteen. In total there are nearly 400,000
observations and just over 13000 for those age 18-24. Happiness is U-shaped in age,
lower for separated people and the least educated and men are less happy in the overall
sample. When the sample is restricted to the young in column 2 the sign reverses and
young men are happier than young women. In both columns, unemployment lowers
happiness, but just as we found for Europe this effect is smaller for the young than for
adults. This is also true in columns three and four, which include controls for income.
Young students are especially happy.
So increasing levels of youth unemployment will likely lower the levels of happiness of
the young, but perhaps by less than older groups, perhaps because they have fewer
53 D.G. Blanchflower (2009), 'Happiness and health insurance' IZA DP #4450 and A.J. Oswald and S. Wu
(2009), 'Well-being across America: evidence from a random sample of one million U.S. citizens',
unpublished paper, Warwick University and Hamilton College.
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responsibilities. Since this is not a longitudinal study, we cannot comment on the duration
of unhappiness associated with unemployment spells. Such effects may be relevant for
our next contribution – the long-term effects of youth unemployment.
d) Youth unemployment creates permanent scars rather than temporary blemishes
We now turn to examine recent evidence on youth unemployment in the UK. We find
evidence that spells of youth unemployment have harmful impacts on a number of
outcomes - happiness, job satisfaction, wages and health - many years later.
In order to explore the impact of unemployment while young on subsequent outcomes we
examined data from the 1958 birth cohort, the National Child Development Study
(NCDS). The NCDS has followed a cohort of people who were born in one week - the
3rd to the 9th March 1958. The National Child Development Study (NCDS) is a
continuing longitudinal study that seeks to follow the lives of all those living in Great
Britain who were born in one particular week in 1958.
To date there have been seven attempts to trace all members of the birth cohort in order
to monitor their physical, educational and social development. The first three sweeps
were carried out by the National Children's Bureau, in 1965, when respondents were aged
7, in 1969 (NCDS1), aged 11 (NCDS2), in 1974, aged 16 (NCDS3). The fourth sweep,
NCDS4, was conducted in 1981, when respondents were aged 23. The fifth sweep was
carried out in 1991, when respondents were aged 33 (NCDS5). For the sixth wave,
conducted in 1999-2000, when respondents were aged 41-42 (NCDS6), fieldwork was
combined with the 1999-2000 wave of the 1970 Birth Cohort Study (BCS70). The
seventh sweep of NCDS was conducted in 2004-2005, when respondents were aged 46-
47 years (NCDS7). It was conducted by telephone, and aimed to update the information
gathered at NCDS6 in 1999-2000.
We have information available to us at age 23 in 1981 on 12537 respondents whether a)
the respondent had ever been unemployed since the age of 16. Unemployment rates in
the UK had risen from 5.4% in 1979 to 6.8% in 1980 and 9.6% in 1981, when the UK
had moved into recession. Unemployment would eventually peak at 11.4% in the spring
of 1984. In the sample, 44% reported that at some time in their working lives they had
been unemployed. The question is whether unemployment when young impacts
outcomes later in life and whether the effect an unemployment spell when young is
greater than when older.
Here we examine four outcomes in 2004/5 when the respondents were aged 46-47 years
a) life satisfaction b) self-reported health status and two for workers only c) job
satisfaction and d) (log of) gross weekly wages in 2004/5 in NCDS7. We also make use
of data on whether the respondent was unemployed at age 33 in NCDS5 in 1991. The
issue is whether a period of unemployment when young has lasting effects; it turns out
that it does. We also include a unique set of controls identifying father's social class
when the respondent was born (and reported in the PMS 1958) as well as ‘11-plus’,
verbal and non-verbal test scores reported at age 11 in NCDS2 in 1969 - tests at the local
level called 11-plus were given a that time to determine entry to grammar school. We are
27
also able to include an indicator variable on health at age 23 measured by the malaise
score (indicating a tendency towards depression), which is highly significant.54 In
addition we can include controls for marital status (5), highest qualification (7), region
(8) labour force status (11) home ownership (5), registered disability and gender. In the
job satisfaction equations we only include three labour force status dummies, exclude the
marital status and home ownership dummies and include 58 industry dummies. In the
wage equation the sample is limited to employees and hence only has a part-time
employee dummy. The results show that youth unemployment continues to hurt two
decades later for the four 2004/5 outcome variables listed above, while unemployment in
one’s early thirties has little effect. As we will see, there are permanent scars from youth
unemployment.
Results are reported in Table 13. We look at the four outcomes in turn.
i) Life satisfaction. Respondents in NCDS7 were asked "On a scale from 0 to 10, where
‘0’ means that you are completely dissatisfied and ‘10’ means that you are completely
satisfied, what number corresponds with how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with the
way life has turned out so far?" The mean life satisfaction score was 7.57 and 7.71 if the
respondent had not been unemployed at age 23 or before and 7.42 if they had. Column 1
reports the results of estimating an ordered logit. Most of the results are standard; life
satisfaction is higher for married people, the educated, workers, especially those who
work full-time, those from higher social classes home owners and those who are not
disabled or sick or depressed (a low malaise score). Those currently unemployed are less
happy; there are enduring effects from spells of unemployment while young, which
continues to lower happiness more than two decades later. Clark et al (2001) also found,
using panel data for Germany from the GSOEP that past unemployment lowers life
satisfaction.55
In column 1 it is apparent that, as is consistently found in all happiness equations, the
current unemployed are less happy. Also, if the individual had experienced any spell of
unemployment before the age of twenty-three, this lowers happiness over twenty years
later at age 46. In contrast, a spell of unemployment at age 33 has no effect on current
happiness. In column 2 it is notable from the significance of the interaction term between
having had a spell of unemployment up to and including age 23 and present
unemployment in column 2, that the impact of past unemployment on wellbeing is
greatest for those currently unemployed. This contrasts with the findings of Clark et al
who found that “the negative well being effect of current unemployment is weaker for
those who have been unemployed more often in the past” (2001, p. 221). The main
54 For a study using the NCDS Malaise scores at ages 23 and 33 see S.Y. Cheung and A. Buchanan (1997),
'Malaise scores in adulthood of children and young people who have been in care', Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry, 38(5), pp. 575 - 580. For an analysis of unemployment before the age of 23
and work histories of the NCDS birth cohort see P.E. Elias and D.G. Blanchflower (1989), Occupational
earnings and work histories: who gets the good jobs?, Department of Employment Research Paper No. 68.
55 A. Clark, Y. Georgellis, Y, and P. Sanfey P (2001), ‘Scarring: the psychological impact of past
unemployment’, Economica, 68(270), pp. 221–241.
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difference though is that their measure of past unemployment relates to the proportion of
the preceding three years that had been spent in unemployment, whereas in Table 9 it
refers it an unemployment spell over twenty years earlier.
ii) Health status. Respondents in NCDS7 were asked ''Please think back over the last 12
months about how your health has been. Compared to people of your own age, would you
say that your health has on the whole been' - 1=excellent; 2=good; 3=fair; 4=poor or
5= very poor?" Of those who had been unemployed in NCDS4 27.8% said they were in
excellent health compared with 34.3% of those who had not been unemployed. Column
3 of Table 13 estimates an ordered logit with self-reported health as the dependent
variable. Once again the youth unemployment variable enters significantly and negative,
whereas being unemployed at age 33 did not have a significant impact on health. The
Malaise score is strongly negative also. Social status of father at birth matters for health
nearly fifty years later. The currently unemployed are not less healthy than full-time
employees.
iii) Job satisfaction. Workers were asked for their degree of satisfaction with their
current job. Possible answers were “very dissatisfied; somewhat dissatisfied; neither;
somewhat satisfied and very satisfied”. Column 3 reports the results of estimating an
ordered logit. Youth unemployment lowered job satisfaction whereas middle-age
unemployment did not.
iv) Log of gross weekly wages. Column 5 of the table estimates a log wage equation.
Past unemployment is also significantly negative. Those with more education earn more,
as would be expected. High IQ score at 11 continues to raise wages two decades later.
People are impacted adversely, in terms of reduced wellbeing, by increases in
unemployment. The unemployed themselves lose their jobs but there is a much wider
loss of wellbeing. High national unemployment lowers wellbeing especially of the
unemployed. It turns out that spells of unemployment are especially harmful to the
individual - and to society - when young people become unemployed. A spell of
unemployment when young continues to have a negative impact in later life.
Youth unemployment is especially harmful. As we noted above there is scant evidence to
suggest that increases in unemployment are attributable to the introduction of the
minimum wage or to the presence of temporary workers from Eastern Europe or that the
young have priced themselves out of work. The onset of recession, at a time when the
size of the youth cohort has temporarily increased, has made matters considerably worse
as youths are especially vulnerable to movements in the business cycle. Now is the time
to act. But what should we do? This is what we turn to consider now.
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7. Policy Measures
Young workers are especially vulnerable to a rise in unemployment. So what kinds of
policies might be worth considering in order to reduce these costs? It seems to us that
there are a number of measures that can be taken to deal with the crisis.56
i) Maintain or even increase aggregate demand
The main issue in the current recession is the lack of demand. Unemployment has not
risen because people have chosen to be unemployed. Unemployment is largely
involuntary. The reserve army of the unemployed is a conscript army and not a volunteer
army. Unemployment makes people unhappy. It lowers the happiness of the people who
are unemployed but it also lowers the happiness of everyone else. Rising unemployment
lowers well-being more than rising inflation.57 Withdrawing fiscal and monetary
stimulus too early is likely to kill off any budding shoots.
The difficulty is that there are simply insufficient jobs available. This means that
measures such as retraining, mobility grants and counseling are unlikely to be successful
on their own. At the very least they will not be as successful as they were when
unemployment was low. Expansion of self-employment may well get unemployment
down but doesn't deal with the problem that there is little work out there so earnings may
well be very low.
The loss of output associated with this slump may be permanent in some developed
countries, in which case the price of labour may have to fall in the longer-run in order to
return to full employment. For those countries with a substantial fiscal deficit, downward
pressure on wages is likely to be strongest in the public sector. But these are longer term
objectives of policy which should only be addressed once recovery is secure.
ii) Target assistance on the young
What specific labour market interventions might be targeted on younger workers?
a) Active Labour Market Programs
There is a substantial body of literature that analyses the effectiveness of labour market
policies for the young. This work is summarized in Bell and Blanchflower (2008). In
Europe there seems to be little evidence that active labor market policies have had a
positive impact on participants’ wages. There is stronger evidence that they have had
positive employment effects but there is no consensus on the question. Even if there
were, it is unclear the extent to which any of the newly created jobs constitute net job
creation or are offset by the displacement of non-participants. In 1996 when asked how
much training schemes in the US help their clientele Nobel Laureate Jim Heckman
replied that ‘zero is not a bad number’ (Economist, 6 April, 1996).
56 For an earlier examination of these issues see D.G. Blanchflower (1999), "What can be done to reduce
the high levels of youth joblessness in the world?”, report to the International Labor Organisation,
downloadable at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~blnchflr/Projects.html
57 Blanchflower (2007, 2009).
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In our view there is little evidence to support large scale, active labour market programs
to help the young or any other group. In a recession when unemployment rates are high
job placement rates from any ALMP are likely to plummet and the schemes are unlikely
to provide adequate rates of return.
b) Expansion of education.
A traditional response of young people in recessions is to withdraw from the labour force.
Applications to colleges and universities rise. This is a sensible response and to be
encouraged. Temporary expansion of the number of places in higher and tertiary
education makes sense. Possibilities exist to also encourage young people to remain in
high school, perhaps with financial inducements. Given the declining size of the youth
cohort any expansion in the numbers is likely to be temporary as the cohort size declines
and the recession recedes.
c) Wage/employment subsidies for the young
Given the evidence that a spell of unemployment while young has especially harmful
effects there is an argument to provide subsidies to private sector firms to hire them. This
could take the form of a subsidy for every additional new worker hired. The concern
would be that older workers would be fired but the subsidy should be based on additional
net hires.
d) Incentives for hiring the young in public sector organisations such as in education and
health
One possibility would be to allow public sector organisations to hire young people for
say, two years, and pay them the equivalent of the benefits they would have received on
unemployment benefits. This would be subsidized training.
e) Lowering the minimum wage for the young.
Where the minimum wage is high there is an argument to have it lowered. The issue is
whether there is evidence that it is a binding constraint. One possibility would be to
temporarily remove it for anyone under age 25, for two years.
iii) Support initiatives from the private sector
In the UK the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) which is the main employer’s
association, has come up with a five-point plan to help reduce youth unemployment.
Much of their programme is consonant with our findings regarding youth unemployment.
Their proposals would seem to be relevant for many countries that are seeking to return
to growth. In our view, their approach is worthy of support.
1. Help employers to offer more apprenticeships
· a subsidy for firms that offer additional apprenticeships to young people, or
employ an apprentice for the first time. This money would not subsidize existing
apprenticeship places
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· a fund for employers who train more apprentices than they need for the benefit of
their sector.
2. Ensure that employing young people is attractive
· the employment prospects for young people with low skills are very sensitive to
wage levels. Youth minimum wages and apprentice rates need to be set with this
in mind.
3. Practical help for young people to get a job
· more universities should offer additional practical sessions (sometimes called
“boot camps”) to help students get a job or start a business. Those that do this
have a big impact
· companies and careers services should encourage unemployed graduates to apply
for internships, volunteer, continue their studies or use their gap year
constructively to help develop employability skills
· tailored support should be given to the most disadvantaged including interview
technique and confidence-building sessions.
4. Offer more young people work experience
· firms should offer internships and encourage schemes for staff to mentor young
people
· public and private-sector employers should open up work experience schemes to
young people who are not in education, employment or training (NEET).
5. Ensure the education system teaches basic skills
· in today’s labour market young people must have basic literacy and numeracy
skills. The UK’s performance here is still too patchy
· schools and colleges should emphasize the need to develop ‘employability skills’
such as communication skills and self-management.
It seems likely that public/private partnerships are especially likely to be successful in
reducing youth joblessness.
8. Conclusion
The recession has hit right across the world, with consequent adverse effects on the
demand for labor. The effects on output have varied across countries, depending on asset
bubbles, imbalances in private or government debt and trade imbalances.
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Governments have generally reacted by stimulating demand through fiscal measures, thus
partly offsetting the fall in private sector demand caused by credit restrictions and the loss
of consumer and business confidence. Central banks around the world, including the
Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the ECB and the Sveriges Riksbank, have cut
interest rates close to zero and engaged in quantitative easing for the first time since the
1930s to get their various economies moving again in the face of a threat of deflation.
Some countries have intervened more decisively than others in the labor market.
Measures to subsidizes those in work have reduced redundancy levels are maintained
demand particularly in countries where the replacement ratio is low. The ILO has
estimated that without discretionary fiscal measures and the effects of automatic
stabilizers, unemployment would have been between 7 and 11 million higher in the G20
countries during 2009.
Thus far, at a country level, increases in unemployment have not been closely related to
falls in output. In some countries, the increase in unemployment has far exceeded the
reduction in output, while in others the reverse is true. This may reflect increases in labor
supply, large-scale redundancies among low skilled workers and/or barriers to adjustment
of labor inputs that fall short of redundancy.
The countries that experienced the largest increases in unemployment tended to
experience asset bubbles that peaked in 2006 or 2007. Unemployment has risen rapidly in
Spain, USA, Ireland and the Baltic States. Countries that were over-reliant on exports
(e.g. Germany and Japan) have experienced large falls in output, but increases in
unemployment have been moderate, perhaps because of policy interventions or because
management has decided to hoard labor.
Historic evidence suggests that financial crises have a long-term negative effect on
economic growth. With a severe crisis, the fall could amount to a permanent reduction of
output of as much as 4%. This will inevitably impact the demand for labor. In these
circumstances, engineering a return to full employment will be a huge challenge for the
policy community. It is not clear that the supply-side policies that were popular in the
1990s and early part of this decade will form part of the solution. Perhaps further
extension of the job saving measures that have been implemented may be necessary to
maintain demand, albeit at the cost of higher government debt. Moves to cut public
expenditure as suggested by some political groups, deep in a recession are a mistake.
The danger is that they will turn a recession into a depression. As Keynes' biographer
Lord Robert Skidelsky has noted recently there is no reason why this should become a
depression.58
“How long will the slump last? This is the worst global turndown since the
Great Depression. But it is highly unlikely to be as bad. The years 1929-32
saw twelve successive quarters of economic contraction. If repeated, this
would mean the economic slide will continue till mid 2011. But the present
contraction will be neither as deep nor as long and this for two reasons.
58 Robert Skidelsky (2009), Keynes. The return of the master. Public Affairs, New York.
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First, the will to international cooperation is stronger. Second, we do have
Keynes. To be a Keynesian in the ‘foxhole’ is not enough. But it is better
than to be a classical economist in the foxhole, which was the only
intellectual support that perplexed policymakers had available during the
Great Depression. Governments at that time made heroic efforts to balance
their budgets: they allowed banks to fail and households to default on their
mortgages; they stuck to the gold standard which kept interest rates high for
the first two years of the slump. Today the intellectual climate is different.
The ‘stimuli’, which have been put in place, will stop the slide into another
Great Depression. The financial system will be cleaned up, and money will
become very cheap, but the collapse of confidence will continue to depress
new investment for years ahead.” (Skidelsky 2009, p.15)
and later.
“Keynes’s big idea was to use macroeconomic policy to maintain full
employment. His specific suggestion was to use monetary policy to secure a
permanently low interest rate and fiscal policy to achieve a continuously
high level of public or semi-public investment. Over time, as the returns on
further additions to capital fell, the high-investment policy should yield to
the encouragement of consumption through redistributing income from the
higher to the lower-saving section of the population. This should be coupled
with a reduction in the hours of work. In short, the object of macro-policy
should be to keep the economy in ‘quasi-boom’ till the economic problem
was solved and people could live ‘wisely, and agreeably, and well’.
(Skidelsky 2009, p.179).
We are not at the point yet of quasi-boom. We are still experiencing the dragging
conditions of semi-slump.
Policy makers around the world appear to have understood this need for stimulus. What
has been absent from the policy response thus far, though, is a coherent approach to the
treatment of younger people who have not yet entered the labor market. We know that
these are particularly vulnerable individuals, whose long-term opportunities can be
damaged by adverse events early in their labor market experience. We also understand
that the discounted social and health costs associated with youth unemployment are
extremely high. It is thus extremely important to introduce policies which enhance the
skills and capabilities of younger workers and which assist them to join the labor market
as quickly as possible.
Spells of unemployment while young create permanent scars. Unemployment is higher
in the years ahead if a young person doesn't make a successful toe-hold into the labour
market early in their lives. Solving youth unemployment is the most pressing problem
governments are facing today. Not dealing with the problem of high, and rising levels of
youth unemployment hurts the youngsters themselves and has potentially severe
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consequences for us all for many years to come. The time to act is now. The young must
be the priority.
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Table 1. Unemployment increases since the turning point of the recession
Minimum
Unempt.
Rate
Turning
Point
Latest
Unempt.
Rate
Latest
observation
Growth in
Unempt.
Rate
Spain 7.9 May-2007 19.3 Sep-2009 11.4
Ireland 4.3 Jan-2007 13.0 Sep-2009 8.7
United States 4.4 Mar-2007 10.2 Oct-2009 5.8
Turkey 8.1 Dec-2006 13.2 Jun-2009 5.1
Denmark 3.1 Jun-2008 6.4 Sep-2009 3.3
G7 5.2 Jun-2007 8.4 Sep-2009 3.2
Slovak Republic 8.9 Sep-2008 12.0 Sep-2009 3.1
Mexico 3.2 Dec-2005 6.1 Sep-2009 2.9
OECD - Total 5.7 Apr-2008 8.6 Sep-2009 2.9
Canada 5.8 Jan-2008 8.6 Oct-2009 2.8
Sweden 5.9 Mar-2008 8.7 Sep-2009 2.8
Czech Republic 4.3 Sep-2008 7.0 Sep-2009 2.7
United Kingdom 5.1 Apr-2008 7.8 Jul-2009 2.7
Hungary 7.1 Jul-2007 9.7 Sep-2009 2.6
Luxembourg 4.0 Sep-2007 6.6 Sep-2009 2.6
OECD - Europe 6.9 Apr-2008 9.4 Sep-2009 2.5
European Union 6.7 Apr-2008 9.2 Sep-2009 2.5
Euro area 7.2 Mar-2008 9.7 Sep-2009 2.5
France 7.6 May-2008 10 Sep-2009 2.4
Finland 6.2 May-2008 8.6 Sep-2009 2.4
Australia 3.9 Feb-2008 5.8 Oct-2009 1.9
Japan 3.6 Jul-2007 5.3 Sep-2009 1.7
Greece 7.5 Sep-2008 9.2 Jun-2009 1.7
Portugal 7.6 May-2008 9.2 Sep-2009 1.6
Italy 5.9 Jun-2007 7.4 Jun-2009 1.5
Poland 6.8 Oct-2008 8.2 Sep-2009 1.4
Belgium 6.6 May-2008 7.9 Sep-2009 1.3
Austria 3.5 Jun-2008 4.8 Sep-2009 1.3
Norway 2.3 Mar-2008 3.2 Aug-2009 0.9
Netherlands 2.7 Nov-2008 3.6 Sep-2009 0.9
Korea 3.0 Jan-2008 3.6 Sep-2009 0.6
Germany 7.1 Dec-2008 7.6 Sep-2009 0.5
Source: OECD
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Table 2. Youth unemployment rates and ratio to overall rates
Age < 25 All Ratio<25/All
Sep-08 Sep-09 Sep-08 Sep-09
EA16 15.7 20.1 7.7 9.7 2.07
EU27 15.8 20.2 7.1 9.2 2.20
Austria 7.9 9.9 3.9 4.8 2.06
Belgium 19.9 20.9 7.3 7.9 2.65
Bulgaria 11.2 16.8 5.2 7.6 2.21
Cyprus 8.7 14.1 3.5 5.9 2.39
Czech Republic 10.3 16.5 4.3 7.0 2.36
Denmark 8.3 11.4 3.4 6.4 1.78
Finland 17.0 22.8 6.5 8.6 2.65
France 19.8 24.5 8.0 10.0 2.45
Germany 9.5 10.4 7.1 7.6 1.37
Hungary 20.0 25.2 7.8 9.7 2.60
Ireland 14.2 27.6 6.7 13 2.12
Latvia 12.9 33.6 8.1 19.7 1.71
Lithuania 14.9 31.2 6.3 13.8 2.26
Luxembourg 18.3 21.6 5.1 6.6 3.27
Malta 11.2 14.8 5.8 7.2 2.06
Netherlands 5.2 6.8 2.7 3.6 1.89
Poland 16.6 20.5 6.8 8.2 2.50
Portugal 17.3 18.6 7.8 9.2 2.02
Slovak Republic 19.2 27.0 8.9 12.0 2.25
Slovenia 10.2 11.7 4.1 5.9 1.98
Spain 26.2 41.7 12.4 19.3 2.16
Sweden 20.5 26.2 6.4 8.7 3.01
UK 15.8 19.5 6.0 7.8 2.50
USA 13.4 18.1 6.2 9.8 1.85
Source: EU
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Table 6. Size of youth cohort in 2008 where the number of 20 year olds=100
5 yrs 10 yrs 15 yrs 25 yrs # Age 20
Euro area 87.6 88.3 93.3 110.8 3,814,153
Armenia 50.0 70.2 93.7 91.7 63,333
Australia 89.3 92.1 96.2 104.4 296,556
Austria 81.5 88.2 99.4 111.7 100,537
Belarus 53.9 54.1 77.0 97.4 162,934
Belgium 90.7 95.0 102.4 105.3 127,376
Bulgaria 64.5 57.4 80.0 104.7 103,028
Croatia 73.0 92.7 88.4 112.2 55,644
Cyprus 68.3 81.8 99.4 114.5 11,757
Czech Republic 69.5 67.3 90.7 109.4 134,600
Denmark 104.9 111.6 114.3 98.3 61,689
Estonia 59.1 55.2 76.4 93.0 21,838
Finland 90.8 96.8 109.2 111.6 61,957
France 97.4 93.0 96.2 101.9 817,614
Georgia 62.8 73.6 96.8 94.1 72,102
Germany 73.6 83.1 85.8 102.7 982,931
Greece 87.4 88.0 94.8 130.2 119,656
Hungary 76.8 78.5 95.6 108.5 125,807
Iceland 93.6 98.2 106.9 109.7 4,399
Ireland 104.1 98.2 95.1 136.5 59,194
Italy 93.8 93.0 100.2 115.1 591,715
Latvia 52.8 48.6 79.6 91.8 37,681
Lithuania 53.3 65.6 93.6 87.3 55,381
Luxembourg 104.3 109.7 106.5 115.3 5,504
Macedonia 68.8 77.7 93.5 100.0 33,263
Moldova 49.3 58.4 80.2 82.3 73,876
Montenegro 80.4 82.1 90.7 100.9 10,053
Netherlands 101.2 97.9 101.3 97.3 198,534
Norway 98.5 107.1 108.8 100.2 58,239
Poland 60.7 70.2 87.0 113.6 579,666
Portugal 94.3 88.4 93.8 124.6 120,091
Romania 58.5 62.2 71.1 89.0 352,397
Russian Federation 53.7 49.9 65.4 96.6 2,556,769
Serbia 81.6 78.0 87.4 106.2 95,973
Slovakia 61.1 70.1 89.4 109.8 82,551
Slovenia 67.7 70.1 76.8 111.0 26,541
Spain 88.9 81.6 86.8 131.5 502,550
Sweden 86.2 82.4 110.5 94.9 115,360
Switzerland 84.1 92.3 102.2 106.9 88,726
Ukraine 51.7 57.4 76.6 97.8 744,442
United Kingdom 80.9 89.4 96.1 97.6 820,200
USA 96.7 94.2 102.3 102.8 4,168,920
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Table 7. Labour market status of 16-24 year olds, USA, 2006-2009 (July)
2006 2007 2008 2009
All
Civilian non-institutional population. 36,989 37,443 37,506 37,586
Civilian labor force................................ 24,664 24,339 24,429 23,691
Participation rate............................ 66.7 65.0 65.1 63.0
Employed.......................................... 21,914 21,717 21,021 19,304
Employment-population ratio...................59.2 58.0 56.0 51.4
Unemployed........................................ 2,750 2,622 3,408 4,387
Looking for full-time work 2,028 1,892 2,552 3,430
Looking for part-time work 722 730 856 957
Unemployment rate 11.2 10.8 14.0 18.5
Not in labor force 12,324 13,104 13,076 13,895
Men
Civilian non-institutional population 18,675 18,926 18,919 18,935
Civilian labor force 13,024 12,845 12,882 12,298
Participation rate 69.7 67.9 68.1 64.9
Employed 11,568 11,421 10,946 9,880
Employment-population ratio...................61.9 60.3 57.9 52.2
Unemployed 1,456 1,424 1,935 2,418
Looking for full-time work 1,152 1,059 1,483 1,973
Looking for part-time work 303 365 453 444
Unemployment rate 11.2 11.1 15.0 19.7
Not in labor force 5,651 6,081 6,037 6,637
Women
Civilian non-institutional population..................18,31418,517 18,587 18,650
Civilian labor force 11,641 11,494 11,547 11,393
Participation rate 63.6 62.1 62.1 61.1
Employed 10,346 10,296 10,075 9,424
Employment-population ratio...................56.5 55.6 54.2 50.5
Unemployed 1,295 1,198 1,473 1,969
Looking for full-time work 876 833 1,070 1,456
Looking for part-time work 419 365 403 513
Unemployment rate 11.1 10.4 12.8 17.3
Not in labor force 6,673 7,023 7,039 7,257
White
Civilian non-institutional population..................28,73629,012 29,012 29,010
Civilian labor force 20,002 19,734 19,760 19,147
Participation rate 69.6 68 68.1 66
Employed 18,193 17,899 17,323 16,000
Employment-population ratio...................63.3 61.7 59.7 55.2
Unemployed 1,808 1,835 2,437 3,147
Looking for full-time work 1,289 1,304 1,759 2,403
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Looking for part-time work 520 531 678 744
Unemployment rate 9.0 9.3 12.3 16.4
Not in labor force 8,735 9,278 9,252 9,863
Black or African American
Civilian non-institutional population 5,426 5,539 5,595 5,662
Civilian labor force. 3,133 2,998 3,062 2,995
Participation rate 57.7 54.1 54.7 52.9
Employed 2,361 2,382 2,302 2,060
Employment-population ratio...................43.5 43.0 41.2 36.4
Unemployed 772 616 760 935
Looking for full-time work 617 488 647 772
Looking for part-time work 155 128 112 163
Unemployment rate 24.7 20.5 24.8 31.2
Not in labor force 2,293 2,541 2,533 2,667
Asian
Civilian non-institutional population..... 1,474 1,511 1,516 1,500
Civilian labor force 687 747 767 740
Participation rate 46.6 49.4 50.6 49.3
Employed 631 689 703 619
Employment-population ratio...................42.8 45.6 46.4 41.3
Unemployed 56 58 64 121
Looking for full-time work 33 32 38 96
Looking for part-time work 23 26 26 24
Unemployment rate 8.2 7.7 8.4 16.3
Not in labor force 787 764 748 760
Hispanic or Latino ethnicity
Civilian non-institutional population 6,406 6,597 6,669 6,752
Civilian labor force 3,943 3,928 4,007 4,014
Participation rate 61.5 59.5 60.1 59.4
Employed 3,534 3,465 3,367 3,143
Employment-population ratio...................55.2 52.5 50.5 46.5
Unemployed 409 464 639 871
Looking for full-time work 287 341 487 693
Looking for part-time work 122 123 153 178
Unemployment rate 10.4 11.8 16 21.7
Not in labor force 2,463 2,669 2,662 2,738
Source: 'Employment and unemployment among youth -- Summer 2009', Bureau of
Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/youth.nr0.htm
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Table 8. Probability of being unemployed ages 16-24 USA, 1979-2009 (dprobits)
1979 1982-1983 2007-2008 2009
1983/2008 dummy -.0030 (1.26) .0210 (8.55)
17 years of age -.0133 (2.31) .0043 (0.74) -.0176 (2.99) -.0235 (3.47)
18 years of age -.0125 (2.18) .0061 (1.07) -.0015 (0.25) .0365 (4.77)
19 years of age -.0243 (4.32) -.0112 (2.00) -.0066 (1.01) .0302 (3.88)
20 years of age -.0383 (6.89) -.0277 (5.03) -.0184 (2.85) .0045 (0.60)
21 years of age -.0423 (7.71) -.0425 (7.85) -.0331 (5.35) -.0071 (0.96)
22 years of age -.0565 (10.50) -.0481 (8.96) -.0310 (4.98) -.0164 (2.24)
23 years of age -.0596 (11.11) -.0549 (10.27) -.0401 (6.61) -.0247 (3.41)
24 years of age -.0654 (12.25) -.0597 (11.22) -.0454 (7.55) -.0406 (5.73)
Male -.0109 (3.94) .0172 (7.16) .0191 (7.69) .0389 (15.21)
Black .1681 (28.89) .2338 (46.99) .0976 (19.53) .1366 (27.40)
Other race .0371 (3.72) .0883 (10.39) .0161 (1.84) .0742 (8.36)
Hispanic .0214 (3.17) .0542 (9.24) .0121 (3.09) .0206 (5.05)
Native American .0800 (5.19) .0919 (7.11)
Asian -.0231 (2.89) .0083 (1.04)
Hawaiian .0390 (1.88) .0769 (3.76)
Years of schooling -.0129 (15.50) -.0247 (34.29) n/a n/a
1/2/3/4th Grade -.0350 (0.93) -.0563 (1.19)
5th or 6th Grade -.0384 (1.20) .0203 (0.47)
7th or 8th Grade .0583 (1.32) .0819 (1.78)
9th Grade .0698 (1.58) .1871 (3.76)
10th Grade .0344 (0.87) .1502 (3.19)
11th Grade .0073 (0.20) .0861 (1.98)
12th Grade No Diploma -.0072 (0.21) .0974 (2.15)
High School Diploma -.0145 (0.42) .0462 (1.16)
Some College -.0569 (1.76) -.0304 (0.82)
Associate Degree – Occup. -.0512 (1.79) -.0451 (1.28)
Associate Degree – Acad. -.0670 (2.64) -.0461 (1.31)
Bachelor's Degree -.0528 (1.81) -.0365 (1.01)
Master's Degree -.0540 (1.74) -.0364 (0.92)
Professional Degree -.0474 (0.89) -.0060 (0.09)
Alabama -.0410 (2.93) -.0337 (3.35) -.0276 (2.24) -.0155 (1.18)
Alaska -.0107 (0.68) -.0696 (7.27) -.0243 (2.20) -.0778 (7.12)
Arizona -.0526 (3.58) -.0475 (4.54) -.0290 (2.50) -.0160 (1.20)
Arkansas -.0495 (3.31) -.0558 (5.37) -.0313 (2.61) -.0466 (3.56)
California -.0379 (3.22) -.0653 (10.29) -.0058 (0.70) .0035 (0.40)
Colorado -.0500 (3.80) -.0827 (9.24) -.0306 (3.11) -.0428 (4.09)
Connecticut -.0247 (1.97) -.0814 (7.53) -.0244 (2.43) -.0547 (5.40)
D.C. -.0534 (2.84) -.0699 (5.96) -.0283 (2.48) -.0117 (0.86)
Delaware -.0078 (0.42) -.0516 (4.53) -.0542 (5.54) -.0515 (4.59)
Florida -.0485 (3.98) -.0856 (11.75) -.0359 (4.25) -.0325 (3.42)
Georgia -.0593 (4.86) -.0940 (11.43) -.0123 (1.19) -.0289 (2.61)
Hawaii -.0096 (0.49) -.0985 (8.62) -.0301 (2.46) -.0576 (4.70)
Idaho -.0415 (2.77) -.0396 (3.58) -.0325 (2.88) -.0151 (1.18)
Illinois -.0265 (2.08) -.0468 (6.15) -.0214 (2.37) -.0200 (2.03)
Indiana -.0472 (4.00) -.0299 (3.22) -.0175 (1.53) -.0037 (0.30)
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Iowa -.0627 (4.88) -.0734 (8.01) -.0540 (6.19) -.0589 (5.90)
Kansas -.0761 (5.93) -.0944 (9.40) -.0355 (3.43) -.0600 (5.58)
Kentucky -.0255 (1.68) -.0246 (2.28) -.0207 (1.81) -.0031 (0.25)
Louisiana -.0338 (2.39) -.0640 (6.65) -.0541 (4.38) -.0554 (4.11)
Maine -.0752 (5.00) -.0490 (4.56) -.0223 (2.16) -.0074 (0.65)
Maryland -.0506 (3.91) -.0816 (9.40) -.0436 (4.81) -.0653 (6.82)
Massachusetts -.0246 (1.34) -.0693 (8.46) -.0393 (3.58) -.0488 (4.20)
Minnesota -.0477 (3.68) -.0726 (8.45) -.0231 (2.49) -.0350 (3.50)
Mississippi -.0620 (4.66) -.0320 (2.94) -.0161 (1.22) -.0551 (3.94)
Missouri -.0606 (4.90) -.0592 (6.35) -.0254 (2.41) -.0379 (3.50)
Montana -.0459 (3.10) -.0672 (6.57) -.0232 (1.84) -.0607 (4.43)
Nebraska -.0726 (5.32) -.0877 (8.92) -.0577 (6.20) -.0996 (10.31)
Nevada -.0670 (4.69) -.0701 (6.39) -.0368 (3.52) -.0138 (1.11)
New Hampshire -.0362 (2.15) -.0882 (8.11) -.0361 (3.82) -.0596 (5.81)
New Jersey -.0234 (1.82) -.0612 (7.56) -.0237 (2.22) -.0321 (2.89)
New Mexico -.0158 (0.96) -.0587 (5.50) -.0415 (3.16) -.0618 (4.26)
New York -.0310 (2.34) -.0551 (7.94) -.0135 (1.50) -.0250 (2.66)
North Carolina -.0659 (5.57) -.0657 (7.23) -.0329 (3.32) -.0264 (2.40)
North Dakota -.0685 (5.14) -.0879 (9.06) -.0626 (6.50) -.0980 (9.09)
Ohio -.0310 (2.33) -.0207 (2.62) -.0140 (1.49) -.0281 (2.87)
Oklahoma -.0673 (4.46) -.0843 (8.98) -.0503 (4.65) -.0825 (7.30)
Oregon -.0339 (2.22) -.0194 (1.71) -.0184 (1.53) .0115 (0.89)
Pennsylvania -.0379 (3.10) -.0326 (4.19) -.0207 (2.26) -.0548 (6.03)
Rhode Island -.0389 (2.66) -.0542 (4.83) -.0099 (0.92) .0047 (0.40)
South Carolina -.0668 (4.84) -.0841 (8.38) -.0231 (1.99) -.0392 (3.20)
South Dakota -.0705 (5.52) -.0929 (10.18) -.0645 (7.04) -.0920 (9.16)
Tennessee -.0417 (3.01) -.0360 (3.51) -.0177 (1.46) -.0119 (0.95)
Texas -.0721 (6.95) -.0910 (14.17) -.0422 (5.41) -.0646 (7.81)
Utah -.0599 (4.58) -.0680 (7.32) -.0654 (6.91) -.0473 (4.15)
Vermont -.0396 (3.09) -.0656 (5.81) -.0297 (2.69) -.0524 (4.63)
Virginia -.0604 (4.90) -.0763 (8.68) -.0557 (6.16) -.0570 (5.46)
Washington -.0274 (1.85) -.0288 (2.72) -.0185 (1.72) -.0214 (1.89)
West Virginia -.0037 (0.20) .0531 (4.06) -.0292 (2.27) -.0206 (1.44)
Wisconsin -.0516 (4.06) -.0342 (3.65) -.0298 (3.08) -.0487 (4.78)
Wyoming -.0617 (4.27) -.0706 (6.23) -.0613 (6.16) -.0717 (6.67)
N 49,519 95,521 56,412 83,552
Pseudo R2 .0606 .0685 .0660 .0625
Notes: excluded categories 16 years of age; 1st grade, Michigan and white
Columns 1-3 use Matched Outgoing Rotation Group files of the CPS while column 4
uses the Basic Monthly Files, January -September. T-statistics in parentheses. Sample is
the workforce (employed + unemployed).
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Table 9. Probability of being unemployed in the UK, ages < 25, 1981-1986 (dprobits)
1981 1983-1986
Age 17 -.0223 (1.50) -.0330 (4.77)
Age 18 -.0625 (5.52) -.0242 (3.59)
Age 19 -.0677 (6.16) -.0513 (7.89)
Age 20 -.0664 (5.77) -.0585 (9.05)
Age 21 -.0704 (6.42) -.0625 (9.68)
Age 22 -.0679 (6.19) -.0760 (11.92)
Age 23 -.0750 (7.20) -.0821 (12.82)
Age 24 -.0724 (6.82) -.0898 (14.07)
Male -.0286 (7.45) -.0374 (12.23)
Teaching, nursing -.0362 (2.01) -.0781 (6.09)
Apprentices -.0398 (2.56) -.0474 (4.52)
A level -.0197 (1.13) -.0199 (1.84)
O level .0174 (0.96) .0192 (1.87)
None .0879 (4.14) .1914 (15.52)
Education dk .0751 (2.57) .1049 (8.31)
Mixed race .0920 (3.06) .1558 (5.37)
Black .1877 (9.19) .2033 (14.61)
Asian .0630 (4.00) .1352 (10.67)
Other .0476 (1.72) .0248 (2.25)
Yorkshire & Humberside -.0236 (2.98) -.0432 (6.10)
East Midlands -.0385 (4.91) -.0786 (10.85)
East Anglia -.0400 (3.98) -.0871 (10.29)
South East -.0576 (8.66) -.1142 (19.00)
South West -.0386 (4.94) -.0839 (11.78)
West Midlands -.0120 (1.48) -.0387 (5.41)
North West .0000 (0.00) -.0196 (2.76)
Wales -.0088 (0.92) -.0115 (1.33)
Scotland -.0041 (0.49) -.0281 (3.90)
Northern Ireland -.0272 (1.29) -.0354 (2.88)
N 18917 68,503
Pseudo R2 .1097 .0685
Source: Labour Force Surveys, 1981, 1982-1984
Notes: excluded categories: white; degree or higher and age 16. Sample is the workforce
(employed + unemployed). T-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 10. Probability of being unemployed, UK Q1 2006 - Q3 2009 (LFS) if age<25
(dprobits)
Q1 2006-Q1 2008 Q2 2008-Q3 2009
2008 dummy -.0058 (1.48) -.0401 (11.31)
17 years of age -.0336 (7.07) -.0615 (8.84)
18 years of age -.0421 (8.99) -.0678 (9.82)
19 years of age -.0541 (11.58) -.0822 (12.01)
20 years of age -.0728 (16.09) -.0921 (13.58)
21 years of age -.0857 (19.57) -.1055 (16.11)
22 years of age -.0916 (21.06) -.1167 (18.16)
23 years of age -.1097 (26.14) -.1418 (23.06)
24 years of age -.1133 (27.09) -.1570 (26.21)
Male .0284 (11.38) .0435 (12.19)
Higher education -.0274 (3.49) -.0441 (4.15)
A-level -.0340 (6.59) -.0564 (8.19)
GCSE A-C .0155 (2.89) .0015 (0.21)
Other qualifications .1072 (14.98) .1005 (10.77)
No qualification .1807 (22.58) .1599 (15.43)
DK qualification .0614 (3.73) .0403 (1.80)
Immigrant -.0269 (5.72) -.0459 (6.81)
Mixed race .0801 (7.03) .0865 (5.67)
Asian .1266 (17.49) .1176 (11.71)
Black .1979 (17.60) .1950 (12.42)
Chinese .1084 (4.53) .0919 (2.68)
Other race .0785 (5.94) .1016 (5.46)
Rest of North -.0058 (0.58) -.0391 (2.89)
South Yorkshire -.0038 (0.34) -.0123 (0.80)
West Yorkshire -.0149 (1.57) -.0474 (3.74)
Rest of Yorkshire -.0283 (2.81) -.0550 (4.04)
East Midlands -.0150 (1.71) -.0639 (5.63)
East Anglia -.0303 (3.22) -.0684 (5.52)
Inner London .0416 (3.59) -.0199 (1.38)
Outer London .0025 (0.27) -.0401 (3.20)
Rest of South East -.0315 (3.91) -.0742 (6.85)
South West -.0480 (5.93) -.0880 (8.19)
West Midlands .0110 (1.08) -.0012 (0.09)
Rest West Midlands -.0262 (2.81) -.0615 (5.03)
Greater Manchester -.0114 (1.19) -.0257 (1.97)
Merseyside .0338 (2.73) .0191 (1.12)
Rest North West -.0303 (3.26) -.0537 (4.26)
Wales -.0119 (1.27) -.0396 (3.09)
Strathclyde -.0051 (0.51) -.0594 (4.64)
Rest Scotland -.0069 (0.72) -.0558 (4.43)
Northern Ireland -.0433 (4.72) -.0604 (4.76)
N 73,205 44,203
Pseudo R2 .0906 .0868
Notes: excluded categories: Tyne and Wear; degree and white. T-statistics in parentheses
Sample is the workforce (employed + unemployed)
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Table 11. Life satisfaction and job situation equations, Europe, 2009 (ordered logits)
Life satisfaction Personal job situation
All ages Ages 15-24 All ages Ages 15-24
15-24 years .5292 (8.07) .1905 (2.88)
25-34 years .3157 (7.33) .1920 (4.39)
35-44 years .1401 (3.58) .0616 (1.56)
55-64 years .1782 (4.24) .2432 (5.50)
65+ years .4501 (8.73) .8422 (14.04)
15-24*unemployed .3356 (2.71) .3022 (2.46)
Male -.0887 (3.51) .0114 (0.17) -.0605 (2.19) -.1424 (1.83)
Student 1.0190 (12.16) 1.2004 (5.34) .9937 (10.94) 1.4527 (6.37)
Unemployed -.8326 (13.11) -.4342 (2.18) -1.6201 (3.02) -.8988 (4.44)
Retired -.0875 (1.60) .1459 (0.23) .3044 (4.71) 1.4380 (1.90)
Immigrant -.0300 (0.57) .1057 (0.63) -.2517 (4.42) .2020 (1.08)
ALS 16-19 .3135 (9.11) .4683 (2.99) .2871 (7.35) .3504 (2.23)
ALS 20+ .6017 (14.93) .7603 (4.01) .4804 (10.63) .3172 (1.67)
No FT education -.1032 (0.78) -.2950 (0.45) -.2474 (1.85) -.6783 (1.11)
ALS refusal -.9315 (6.87) .8020 (0.95) -.6338 (4.00) -.2667 (0.42)
ALS dk .0178 (0.17) -.1428 (0.37) .0556 (0.49) -.8026 (1.96)
Married .2403 (5.55) -.4310 (3.20) .1867 (4.14) -.0889 (0.64)
Remarried .1728 (1.84) -.5037 (0.68) .0377 (0.37) 1.2846 (1.79)
Living as married .0415 (0.76) -.0267 (0.26) .0646 (1.14) -.1832 (1.65)
Previously living -.5177 (7.44) -.2059 (1.29) -.1439 (1.98) -.1243 (0.74)
Divorced -.4273 (7.06) -.9843 (1.73) -.1935 (2.98) .0102 (0.02)
Separated -.5139 (4.93) -1.2768 (2.38) -.1959 (1.77) -.7205 (1.19)
Widowed -.2223 (3.76) -.9416 (1.20) -.1643 (2.39) -1.6216 (1.55)
Austria -.5486 (6.04) -.5539 (2.06) -.1945 (2.06) -.4239 (1.45)
Bulgaria -2.5966 (28.75) -1.7749 (6.82) -1.6114 (17.49) -.8949 (3.16)
Croatia -.6329 (6.86) .0366 (0.14) -1.2008 (12.56) -1.1382 (3.96)
Cyprus -.1090 (0.98) .1161 (0.42) -.4292 (3.42) -.6839 (1.80)
Czech Republic -.9037 (10.15) -.8603 (3.19) -.6488 (6.81) -.7466 (2.44)
Denmark 1.6149 (17.18) 1.0524 (3.69) 1.1195 (11.60) .5266 (1.70)
East Germany -.9318 (8.59) -1.0955 (3.17) -.4818 (4.17) -.2476 (0.70)
Estonia -1.2494 (13.93) -1.1797 (4.79) -.7254 (6.91) -.6934 (2.24)
Finland .2364 (2.66) -.0952 (0.35) 1.2200 (12.49) -.1499 (0.46)
France -.7640 (8.56) -.3732 (1.41) -.7232 (7.49) -.7130 (2.39)
Greece -2.0545 (23.17) -1.9977 (7.83) -1.2713 (13.20) -1.1903 (3.85)
Hungary -2.1121 (23.72) -1.9002 (6.82) -2.1698 (22.06) -2.2888 (7.07)
Ireland .5491 (6.02) -.3986 (1.49) -.8457 (8.75) -2.0833 (7.20)
Italy -1.6602 (18.71) -1.4518 (5.52) -1.4246 (15.67) -1.6471 (5.83)
Latvia -1.9387 (21.66) -1.7824 (7.60) -1.0872 (11.45) -.9936 (3.80)
Lithuania -2.0630 (23.05) -1.5708 (6.19) -1.3124 (13.73) -1.1747 (4.06)
Luxembourg .7882 (7.14) .4392 (1.55) .6571 (5.32) -.2612 (0.75)
Macedonia -1.5557 (16.81) -1.4849 (5.92) -1.1912 (12.51) -1.7036 (6.14)
Malta -.1825 (1.58) -.0232 (0.07) -.2713 (2.25) -.7810 (2.07)
Netherlands .9480 (10.66) .8262 (2.91) .3003 (3.05) .4160 (1.32)
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Poland -1.1120 (12.28) -.9892 (4.07) -.8536 (8.99) -.6407 (2.37)
Portugal -1.9456 (21.60) -1.4846 (6.02) -1.2919 (13.37) -1.2939 (4.74)
Romania -1.9955 (22.32) -1.6163 (6.26) -1.3819 (13.80) -1.2968 (4.20)
Slovakia -1.1799 (13.20) -.8552 (3.13) -1.1532 (12.13) -.9063 (2.88)
Slovenia -.3267 (3.63) -.4520 (1.81) -.3963 (4.18) -1.0324 (3.68)
Spain -.5140 (5.64) -.0447 (0.17) -.6489 (6.97) -.9923 (3.57)
Sweden .9161 (10.17) .5564 (2.03) .8348 (8.68) -.4314 (1.31)
Turkey -1.4681 (15.02) -1.1808 (5.09) -1.4563 (15.17) -1.5514 (6.25)
UK .4153 (4.90) .5122 (2.09) .2853 (3.08) -.3468 (1.25)
West Germany -.2917 (3.24) -.5151 (2.01) -.2015 (2.10) -.3791 (1.33)
LR 3-4 -.0281 (0.58) -.0082 (0.06) -.0187 (0.35) .0568 (0.34)
LR 5-6 centre .0963 (2.15) .1407 (1.02) .0806 (1.66) .1114 (0.74)
LR 7-8 .1493 (3.00) .1214 (0.78) .1617 (2.98) .2349 (1.37)
LR right .4022 (7.05) .5943 (3.30) .3084 (5.00) .4686 (2.38)
LR n/a .0222 (0.40) .4715 (2.80) .0041 (0.07) .1551 (0.84)
LR dk -.0559 (1.09) .2636 (1.85) -.0874 (1.54) -.0350 (0.22)
/cut1 -3.1719 -3.2802 -1.6555 -2.0788
/cut2 -1.3181 -1.5008 .0266 -.3943
/cut3 1.8420 1.5636 2.9507 2.5476
N 29,517 3655 24040 2800
Pseudo R2 .1472 .1053 .1511 .1154
Notes: excluded categories - Belgium; Age Left school (ALS) <16; Left-right scale - left
and single. All equations also include a further fourteen occupation dummies for the
employed.
Q1. On the whole are you not at all satisfied; not very satisfied; fairly satisfied or very
satisfied with the life you lead? Q2. How would you judge the current situation in each
of the following? Your personal job situation - very bad; rather bad; rather good or very
good. T-statistics in parentheses.
Source: Eurobarometer #71.1, January-February 2009
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Table 12. Life satisfaction, United States, 2008 (ordered logits)
All ages Ages 18-24 All ages Ages 18-24
15-24 years .4052 (18.07) .4652 (20.59)
25-34 years .0912 (7.16) .1660 (12.90)
35-44 years .0099 (0.91) .0180 (1.65)
55-64 years .2036 (20.06) .2361 (23.08)
65+ years .3185 (25.86) .4283 (34.24)
15-24*unemployed .3588 (5.98) .2350 (3.90)
Male -.0879 (12.69) .1519 (4.16) -.1333 (19.02) .1160 (3.15)
Unemployed -.9683 (53.28) -.5011 (8.19) -.7469 (40.46) -.4576 (7.41)
Self employed .0901 (7.59) -.0951 (1.05) .1174 (9.81) -.1057 (1.17)
Homemaker .0202 (1.56) .1582 (1.95) .0964 (7.30) .1934 (2.37)
Student .0351 (1.27) .2915 (6.88) .1150 (4.13) .2666 (6.20)
Retired .0036 (0.33) .4330 (0.93) .1209 (10.76) .3933 (0.84)
Disabled -1.3051 (85.80) -.9282 (6.94) -1.0384 (65.58) -.8390 (6.24)
Black -.0010 (0.08) -.2767 (4.46) .0866 (6.51) -.1919 (3.06)
Asian -.3075 (11.27) -.5877 (5.00) -.2511 (9.14) -.5522 (4.69)
Hawaiian -.1351 (1.90) -.1214 (0.59) -.0949 (1.33) -.0646 (0.31)
Native American -.0380 (1.35) -.3632 (3.17) .0747 (2.62) -.2864 (2.49)
Other race -.1647 (4.05) -.1503 (0.84) -.1038 (2.54) -.1179 (0.66)
Multi-race -.1994 (7.55) -.4291 (3.92) -.1499 (5.65) -.4003 (3.65)
Hispanic -.0233 (1.56) -.1429 (2.52) .1202 (7.92) -.0541 (0.94)
Schooling Grades 1-8 -.0522 (0.67) -.2327 (0.54) .0152 (0.20) -.1658 (0.38)
Schooling Grades 9-11 -.0271 (0.35) -.2592 (0.63) .0155 (0.20) -.2391 (0.57)
High school graduate .1667 (2.19) -.0772 (0.19) .1283 (1.67) -.0692 (0.17)
1-3yrs college .2830 (3.71) .1098 (0.27) .1567 (2.04) .0756 (0.18)
College graduate .6481 (8.50) .5422 (1.31) .3691 (4.80) .4436 (1.07)
Schooling n/a .2791 (2.49) .4414 (0.63) .1465 (1.30) .3553 (0.51)
Divorced -.8142 (82.51) -.8077 (4.64) -.5925 (57.78) -.7508 (4.28)
Widowed -.6338 (58.22) -1.0359 (2.05) -.4619 (41.32) -.9984 (1.97)
Separated -1.0393 (44.38) -.8547 (4.95) -.8093 (34.17) -.8032 (4.64)
Single -.8293 (72.61) -.4228 (7.94) -.6096 (51.82) -.3991 (7.36)
Living as married -.5801 (26.19) -.4149 (5.67) -.4539 (20.33) -.3747 (5.08)
Year2 -.0337 (0.61) .4770 (2.07) -.0490 (0.88) .4662 (2.02)
/cut1 -4.8912 -5.3989 -4.2766 -5.1012
/cut2 -3.1857 -3.5090 -2.5643 -3.2092
/cut3 .1052 -.1443 .7645 .1742
Income dummies - - 9 9
N 396,794 13,544 396,793 13,544
Pseudo R2 .0561 .0322 .0660 .0373
Notes: all equations include 50 state dummies plus Guam, Puerto Rico and US Virgin
Islands. Excluded categories ages 45-54; wage worker and no schooling
Source: Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Survey (BRFSS), 2008.
Q. In general, how satisfied are you with your life? Very dissatisfied; dissatisfied;
satisfied or very satisfied. T-statistics in parentheses.
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